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REFERENDUM ZONING: 
LEGAL DOCTRINE AND PRACTICE 
Ronald H. Rosenberg* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Local government law in the United States has developed several 
clearly defined patterns during the last century. Two of them-
direct decisionmaking by plebiscite and localized land use control-
are the subject of this Article. American legal policy regarding the 
public control of land use has vested power primarily in the hands 
of officials in the local levels of government. In the landmark case 
of Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty, the Supreme Court of the United 
States sustained not only the general concept of police power regula-
tion of land development but also the validity of regulatory systems 
founded upon zoning ordinances enacted by municipal legislative 
bodies. 1 Once approved by the Euclid decision, municipal zoning 
of land soon became the predominant method of guiding the physical 
development of the community. Such a technique, drawn from a 
United States.Department of Commerce model statute, 2 characterizes 
zoning as primarily legislative in nature with limited provision made 
for the granting of administrative relief in situations of special hard-
ship. This traditional conception of public land use control imparts 
significant decisionmaking power to elected governmental officials 
and public spirited citizens serving on boards of adjustment and 
zoning appeals. However, under this system of public regulation, 
direct citizen participation is circumscribed severely. The role of 
other interested citizens-both landowners and neighbors-generally 
is limited to the casting of votes for local elected officials and the 
*Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William and Mary, 
Williamsburg, Virginia, B.A., Columbia University, 1971; Masters of Regional Plan-
ning, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1974;J.D., University of North Carolina 
at Chapel Hill, 1975. The author gratefully acknowledges the financial support of the 
Marshall-Wythe School of Law in funding this research project. 
1. See 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
2. The Standard State Zoning Enabling Act was prepared and distributed by the 
United States Department of Commerce during the early 1920's. 4 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN 
LAw OF ZoNING § 30.01 (2d ed. 1977). This model statute was adopted quickly in whole 
or in part by a large number of states in an effort to provide local governments with a 
specific source of delegated authority for zoning purposes. By 1925, the model act had 
been used by 19 states. 1 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 2.2 (2d ed. 1976). 
This statutory framework was to influence greatly the structure of American land use 
control programs thereafter. 
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presentation of views at public hearings. As a result, the locally 
executed zoning system confers substantial land development con-
trol upon a small number of public servants. This structure of land 
use control continues into the present day. 
Before zoning was adopted as the major method of regulating 
land use in the United States, many state legislatures had enacted 
constitutional and statutory provisions that encouraged direct citizen 
involvement in state and local political decisions. In many states, 
legislation empowered citizens both to initiate statutes and ordinances 
by direct vote and to review regularly enacted laws by referendum; 
popular control of major social issues was emphasized. This move-
ment, prevalent at the turn of the century, received its impetus from 
a variety of sources. Foremost was an intention to check the un-
bridled power of what were perceived to be il).sensitive, incompe-
tent or corrupt legislative bodies. 
Shortly after the Euclid decision was handed down, state courts 
were presented with issues concerning the application of referenda 
requirements to zoning decisions. Even at this point, the incom-
patibility of the representative versus direct means of land use regula-
tion was noticeable. Although it decided three related cases in the 
early part of the century, 3 the Supreme Court finally reached the 
federal constitutional issues involved with making land use decisions 
by direct vote in the 1976 decision of City of Eastlake v. Forest City 
Enterprises. 4 The Court found no federal due process deprivation in 
a municipal system that subjected all zoning changes to community 
ratification by referendum vote. Chief Justice Burger, writing for 
the majority, considered this practice unobjectionable because it con-
stituted a local legislative decision by direct recourse to the elec-
torate. The Chief Justice thought it inconceivable that such a pro-
cedure could be an improper delegation of legislative power given 
that the voters were the source of local legislative authority. By em-
bracing this interpretation of referendum theory and by rejecting 
the pragmatic considerations raised by Justice Stevens in dissent, 5 
the majority endorsed a practice with the potential to overturn the 
conventional methods of regulating land development. 
This Article examines the phenomenon of referendum zoning from 
the standpoint of both emerging legal doctrine and empirical analysis. 
Part II reviews the historical development of referenda and the 
3. Washington ex rel. Seattle Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116 (1928); Thomas 
Cusack Co. v. Chicago, 242 U.S. 526 (1917); Eubank v. Richmond, 226 U.S. 137 (1912). 
4. 426 u.s. 668 (1976). 
5. !d. at 680-94 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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Supreme Court's generally supportive view of plebiscite decision-
making. Next, the Eastlake case is discussed, focusing upon the 
Supreme Court's rationale for upholding this form of direct 
policymaking. Part III evaluates the response of state courts on 
referendum zoning cases following the Eastlake opinion. Finally, part 
IV analyzes data concerning land use referenda in Cuyahoga 
County, Ohio, comparing actual experience with the judicial assump-
tions appearing in reported decisions. Conclusions then follow with 
respect to the desirability of incorporating referendum zomng as 
a feature of the municipal land use control system. 
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF REFERENDA 
A. The Development of the Plebiscite in America 
American political development has produced a system of 
representative decisionmaking by popularly elected officials. Follow-
ing the American Revolution, state and local governments followed 
the legislative model established on the federal level by the United 
States Constitution. The pervasive pattern of the nineteenth cen- . 
tury was to centralize political power and the prerogative to make 
socially important decisions in the state legislatures. 6 This fact, in 
part, is reflected by statutory construction rules that were devised 
. to limit the freedom of action of municipal corporations. 7 As the 
century progressed, however, the needs of the rapidly expanding 
urban areas required that cities be granted power to deal effectively 
with their emerging problems. This trend, coupled with the grow-
ing political power of the cities, aided the development of the home 
6. See 2 E. McQuiLLIN, THE LAw OF MuNICIPAL CoRPORATIONS§ 4.02 (3d ed. 1979). 
In Commonwealth v. Moir, 199 Pa. 534, 49 A. 351 (1901), Judge Mitchell stated the 
following general principles: 
Municipal corporations are agents of the state, invested with certain subordinate 
governmental functions for reasons of convenience and public policy. They are 
created, governed, and the extent of their powers determined by the legislature, 
and subject to change, repeal, or total abolition at its will. They have no vested 
rights in their offices, their charters, their corporate powers, or even their cor-
porate existence. This is the universal rule of constitutional law, and in no state 
has it been more clearly expressed and more uniformly applied than in 
Pennsylvania. 
/d. at 541, 49 A. at 352. 
7. See 1 J. DILLON, THE LAw OF MuNICIPAL CORPORATIONS§ 89 (5th ed. 1911). 
Quoting Chief Justice Shaw of Massachusetts, Judge Dillon stated: ''[Municipal corpora-
tions] can exercise no powers but those which are conferred upon them by the act by 
which they are constituted, or such as are necessary to the exercise of their corporate powers, 
the performance of their corporate duties, and the accomplishment of the purposes of their 
association." Spaulding v. Lowell, 40 Mass. (23 Pick.) 71, 74 (1839). 
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rule doctrine, resulting in increased municipal self-determination. 8 
Yet as the nineteenth century drew to a close, the movement sup-
porting the citizens' right to decide important state and local issues 
by plebiscite rapidly grew in popularity. 9 
The drafters of the United States Constitution made no explicit 
provision for democratic decisionmaking by direct vote. 10 Although 
the Declaration of Independence recognized the source of govern-
ment legitimacy to be the consent of the citizenry, there was a reluc-
tance to create a "pure democracy." 11 The constitutional theorists 
expressed a fear that direct democracy-especially during a period 
of limited voting franchise-could lead to a tyranny of majoritarian 
rule. 12 As a matter of federal law, the Constitution granted citizens 
a right to live under a republican form of government. 13 Both 
Madison and Jefferson similarly construed the meaning of 
"republican": a representational form of government in which the 
citizens directly elect officials to make individual legislative and 
executive judgments. 14 
8. See 2 E. McQuiLLIN, supra note 6, § 9.08. The idea of local self-governance through 
home rule charters was initiated by an 1875 amendment to the Missouri Constitution. 
See Mo. CaNST. art. VI, § 19. For a list of states having constitutional provisions for home 
rule charters, see I E. McQUILLIN, THE LAw OF MuNICIPAL CoRPORATIONS § 3.21 (3d 
ed. 1979). See generally C. RHYNE, MuNICIPAL LAW § 4-3 (1957). 
9. See, e.g., J. BARNETT, THE OPERATION OF THE INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM, AND RECALL 
IN OREGON 3-5 (1915). A complete listing of state initiative and referenda provisions appears 
in REFERENDUMS: A CoMPARATIVE STUDY OF PRACTICE AND THEORY, 69-70 (D. Butler 
& A. Ranney eds. 1978) [hereinafter cited as CoMPARATIVE STUDY]. 
10. In fact, most of the original state constitutions framed during the revolutionary 
period were not approved by referenda. Only in New Hampshire and Massachusetts did 
the citizens have an opportunity to vote directly on their state constitutions. See E. 
OBERHOLTZER, THE REFERENDUM IN AMERICA 106-7 (1912). 
11. In The Federalist, James Madison wrote: 
[A] pure democracy, by which I mean a society consisting of a small number of 
citizens, who assemble and administer the government in person, can admit of 
no cure for the mischiefs of faction. A common passion or interest will, in almost 
every case, be felt by a majority of the whole; a communication and concert result 
from the form of Government itself; and there is nothing to check the inducements 
to sacrifice the weaker party or an obnoxious individual. Hence it is, that such 
democracies have ever been found ... incompatible with personal security or 
the rights of property .... 
THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 133 Q. Madison) (B. Wright ed. 1966). 
12. /d. 
13. U.S. CaNsT. art. IV, § 4. 
14. In 1816, Jefferson defined the term "republic" in the following way: 
Indeed, it must be acknowledged, that the term republic is of very vague applica-
tion in every language .... Were I to assign to this term a precise and definite 
idea, I would say, purely and simply, it means a government by its citizens in 
mass, acting directly and personally, according to rules established by the majority; 
and that every other government is more or less republican, in proportion as it 
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While direct voter decisionmaking was not incorporated into 
national political doctrine, it was a feature of local government as 
early as the 'seventeenth century. The New England town meeting 
frequently has been hailed as the forerunner of the local plebiscite. 15 
Another antecedent to the modern referendum was the adoption 
has in its composition more or less of this ingredient of the direct action of the 
citizens. 
15 WRITINGS OF THOMAS jEFFERSON 19 (A. Lipscomb ed. 1904); see also THE FEDERALIST 
No. 39 0. Madison). 
15. An early treatise on the law of municipal corporations described the New England 
town meeting as follows: 
A New England town is the best modern representative of a pure democracy. 
All the qualified voters of the territory are members of the corporation, and meet 
at certain periods as a general assembly for the transaction of the business of the 
community. The representative system.is not used, and each voter is entitled to 
participate personally in the work of government. The regular annual sessions 
are presided over by a moderator and are attended by the town officers, .who render 
their accounts for the year and their estimates of the money required for the en-
suing year. The meeting approves or disapproves of the action of its officers and 
elects their successors. The organization of the towns is not entirely uniform. The 
officers are commonly selectmen; a town clerk, a treasurer, a collector of taxes, 
assessor, a school committee, and such other minor officers as constables, library 
trustees and surveyors of highways. All the executive functions of local govern-
ment are in the hands of these officials, governed largely by general statutes. The 
ta~es for the payment of county expenses are apportioned by the counties, but 
are raised by the towns. 
C. ELLIOTT, THE PRINCIPLES OF THE,LAW OF MUNICIPAL CoRPORATIONS§ 18 (3d ed. 1925). 
In City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enter. , Chief Justice Burger considered the town meeting, 
along with the idea of a referendum, to be "a means for direct political participation." 
426 U.S. 668, 673 (1976). But the Chief justice's description of the town meeting as "both 
a practical and symbolic part of our democratic processes,'' id., has evoked challenge by 
historians. Rather than reflecting true participatory democracy, the town meeting merits 
description not as a public forum for the resolution of conflicting social views and In-
terests but instead as a community demonstration of consensus. 
For example, Professor Michael Zuckerman notes that: 
The town meeting had one prime purpose;and it was not the provision of a neutral 
battleground for the clash of contending parties or interest groups. In fact, nothing 
could have been more remote from the minds of men who repeatedly affirmed, 
to the very end of the provincial period, that ''harmony and unanimity'' were 
what ''they most heartily wish to enjoy in all their public concerns.'' 
Zuckerman, The Social Context of Democracy in Massachusetts, 25 WM. & MARY Q. 523, 539 
(1968). 
The town meeting did not encourage spirited advocacy of interest among competing 
groups; decisions reached at the town meeting reflected the thoughts of a limited segment 
of homogenous citizens, those possessing the voting franchise. Colonial New England was 
largely of uniform racial, national and cultural characteristics. Its citizens were mostly 
white Anglo-Saxon Protestants with very few Germans, Irish, Scotch, Scotch-Irish, French 
Catholics, Blacks and Native Americans. See Zuckerman, supra, at 538. 
Thus, colonial New England was not a pluralistic, democratic society in ·the current 
sense of the term. Given these differing social compositions and traditions, it is inappropriate 
to cite the New England town meeting as a model for direct democratic decisionmaking 
at the local level of government. 
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of state legislation that authorized local option laws. During the nine-
teenth century, state legislatures wishing to avoid divisive subjects, 
particularly those with both economic and moral repercussions, 
granted local governments the power to submit a limited· range of 
questions to voters. 16 Most commonly the local option principle was 
applied to the sale and consumption of alcoholic beverages. 17 Other 
topics subject to this form of local control were community fencing 
rules, oyster harvesting methods, Sunday "blue laws" and the use 
of automated voting machines. 18 
As a precursor of general referendum and initiative power, the 
local option incurred the same criticism currently leveled at its 
modern-day descendant. In Rice v. Foster, decided in 1847, the 
Delaware Court of Errors and Appeals invalidated that state's local 
option liquor statute and described it as representing a policy that 
would ''demolish the whole frame and texture of our republican 
form of government, and prostrate every thing to the worse species 
of tyranny and despotism, the ever varying will of an irresponsible 
multitude. " 19 Despite such early disapproval, this method of local 
decisionmaking continues into the twentieth century and applies to 
an increasingly broad range of activities. 20 
16, Local option schemes were used as a method of dealing with proposals "essential-
ly of a disagreeable and vexing character." E. OBERHOLTZER, supra note 10, at 286. 
Oberholtzer neatly described the attitude of the authorizing legislature: 
The legislature hesitates either to enact or to refuse to enact a certain measure. 
It would be criticized by partisans no matter what policy it should adopt. The 
legislators say then to the people: "We will refer this question to you. You elect 
us and we represent you. In this matter we will submit the law directly to you 
and if you are in favor of it you may pass it; if, however, you are opposed to 
it you will reject it. In any case you cannot blame us." 
!d. Described in this fashion, the local option principle represents an abdication of political 
responsibility for controversial subjects primarily affecting the local level. This form of 
limited power delegation merits comparison with a general policy of centralized state 
legislative authority. See 0. REYNOLDS, HANDBOOK OF LOCAL GovERNMENT LAW 75-77 
(1982). 
17. See C. ELLIOTT, supra note 15, § 321; E. OBERHOLTZER, supra note 10, at 288. 
18. See E. Oberholtzer, supra note 10, at 286-310. 
19. 4 Del. (4 Harr.) 479, 489 (1847). Compare Forest City Enter. v. City of Eastlake, 
41 Ohio St. 2d 187, 196, 324 N .E.2d 740, 746 (1975) (Brown, J .) ("Due process of law 
. . . 'requires that a municipality protect individuals against the arbitrary exercise of 
municipal power, by assuring that fundamental policy choices underlying the exercise 
of that power are articulated by some responsible organ of municipal government."), rev 'd, 
426 U.S. 668 (1976). , 
20. 0. REYNOLDs, supra note 16, at 91 n.18. One limitation on the local option method 
of state legislation has been the restriction in some state constitutions against special or 
local legislation. See 1 C. SANDS & H. LIBONATI, LocAL GovERNMENT LAw§ 3.35 (1981). 
This position is contrary to the general rule upholding such legislation . 
.. 
1983] REFERENDUM ZONING 387 
The development of the initiative and referendum devices as a 
widespread feature of local government law accelerated at the end 
of the nineteenth century. From the beginning of the union, states 
have adopted and amended their constitutions by the use of 
referenda. 21 Interest in the use of referenda and initiatives for state 
and local legislative issues, however, has taken longer to develop. 
At the urging of the Populist and Progressive parties and the com-
bined support of organized labor, a movement-intended to cleanse 
state politics of the control by political bosses and special interest 
groups-22began in the 1890's to encourage the spread of direct local 
legislation. 23 
In 1898, South Dakota became the first state to provide, by con-
stitutional amendment, for statewide statutory initiatives and 
referenda. 24 Within four years, Utah and Oregon followed suit. 
During the period from 1906 to 1918, nineteen more states joined 
these original three. 25 As of 1978, thirty-nine states allow statutory 
referenda, and twenty-three permit state legislation by initiative. 26 
21. Massachusetts (1777), New Hampshire (1779), Rhode Island (1788), Maine (1816), 
Mississippi (1817), Connecticut (1818) and Alabama (1819) employed constitutional re· 
ferenda. See CoMPARATIVE STUDY, supra note 9, at 68·69. Today all states except Delaware 
require referendum approval of constitutional modifications. !d. at 69. 
22. J. BARNETT, supra note 9, at 4. 
23. See Note, Zoning and the Referendum: Converging Powers, Conflicting Processes, 6 N.Y. U. 
REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 97, 109-10 & n.130 (1977); see also Comment, Judicial Review 
of Laws Enacted by Popular Vote, 55 WASH. L. REv. 175, 178 n.20 (1979) [hereinafter cited 
as Comment, Popular Vote]. 
The wellspring of this movement was not indigenous to the United States. The model 
for the American direct legislation movement was based on the Swiss experience, dating 
back to the Middle Ages. See E. OBERHOLTZER, supra note 10, at 100; Comment, Popular 
Vote, supra, at 177. Apparently the Swiss referendum was used as early as 1309. See L. 
TALLIAN, DIRECT DEMOCRACY: AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM, 
AND RECALL PRocEss 10 (1977). However, there are other instances of direct group decision-
making that are far more ancient. See Shafer, A Teutonic Institution Revived: The Referen-
dum, 22 YALE L.J. 398, 398-400 (1913); Comment, Popular Vote, supra, at 176. 
In Switzerland, direct votes were taken on both national constitutional subjects, such 
as the Second Helvetic Constitution, and local issues at the canton level. The Swiss theory 
of direct democratic action initially gained adherents from the western United States. 
24. The constitutional amendment was passed by the South Dakota legislature in 1897 
and was adopted by the citizens, one year later, by a vote of23,816 to 16,483. The system 
allowed citizens to initiate state statutes and to review· existing legislation. The amend· 
ment denied the governor veto power over the referendum or initiative result. See E. 
OBERHOLTZER, supra note 10, at 392-93. The first referendum was not conducted until 
1908 when voters considered four issues: (1) a local option liquor law; (2) a bill to curb 
the practices of divorce lawyers; (3) a law prohibiting theatrical performances on Sunday; 
and ( 4) a bill prohibiting the killing of quail for five years. All were successful except 
the local option liquor law. /d. at 394. 
25. CoMPARATIVE STUDY, supra note 9, at 69. 
26. !d. at 70. 
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Local government referenda are provided for in thirty-nine states27 
and are used frequently. One estimate has placed the national total 
number of local referenda at ten to fifteen thousand annually. 28 The 
subject matter of these referenda has varied, encompassing, for in-
stance, tax and financing measures, fluoridation of municipal water 
supplies, anti-discrimination ordinances and school desegregation 
matters. 29 
B. The Supreme Court's View of Referenda and Initiatives 
With the rise of direct legislation techniques at the state and local 
level of government, it was inevitable that the Supreme Court of 
the United States would be asked to consider challenges to their 
use. Cases involving referenda and initiatives, typically deciding 
questions of great public iT).terest, may be categorized into three 
groups. The first involves early cases challenging referendum legisla-
tion, which presumably denies a republican form of government, 
as violative of the guarantee clause of the Constitution. The second 
group encompasses decisions examining the notion of voting rights 
in referendum elections. Finally, a third group contains an evalua-
tion of the substantive outcomes resulting from the referenda. 
1. The Guarantee Clause Cases 
The initial surge of interest in local referenda occurred primarily 
in the western states at the end of the nineteenth century. 30 Shortly 
after use of local referenda became an option, litigation arose 
challenging this method of lawmaking. In two cases originating in 
Oregon, 31 and one in Ohio, 32 the Supreme Court considered whether 
the federal guarantee clause33 could prevent the direct exercise of 
legislative power by the citizens of a state. 
27. !d. at 71-72 (Table 4-2). 
28. Hamilton, Direct Legislation: Some Implications of Open Housing Referenda, 64 AM. PoL. 
Sc1. REv. 124, 125 (1970). 
29. See Comment, Popular Vote, supra note 23, at 181-82 & nn.42-47. 
30. See Price, The Initiative: A Comparative State Anarysis and Reassessment of a Western 
Phenomenon, 28 WEsT PoL. 243, 243-48 (1975); supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
31. Kiernan v. Portland, 223 U.S. 151 (1912); Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. 
Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912). 
32. Ohio ex rei. Davis v. Hildebrandt, 241 U.S. 565 (1916). 
33. Article IV,§ 4 of the Constitution, the guarantee clause, provides: "The United 
States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government, 
and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on application of the Legislature, 
or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic violence." 
U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 4. 
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In Pacific States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Oregon, the telephone 
company, Pacific States, challenged the right of Oregon voters to 
impose, by statewide initiative, a two percent tax on the gross 
revenues of the firm. 34 Pacific States urged the Court to conclude 
that legislation by plebiscite was not a "Republican Form of Govern-
ment'' and therefore was unconstitutional. Representative 
democracy, under this theory, was the equivalent of republican 
government. 
Speaking through Justice White, the Court refused to consider 
this argument, finding the claim to be nonjusticiable under the 
political question doctrine. 35 Pacific States Telephone & Telegraph 
thereafter would stand for the proposition that the federal judiciary 
would not question the political organization of the states under the 
guarantee clause. 36 Implicit in this holding and explicit in the Eastlake 
decision, sixty-four years later, was acceptance of the plebiscite as 
a valid exercise of legislative powerY 
34. This annual license fee was imposed in 1906, just four years after Oregon had 
amended its constitution to reserve initiative and referendum powers in its citizens. 223 
U.S. 118, 133-34 (1912) (describing OR. CoNST. art. IV, § 1). 
35. /d. at 151. The determination of what constituted a republican form of govern-
ment involves "political and governmental [issues] and [is] embraced within the scope 
of powers conferred upon Congress, and not therefore within the reach of judicial power." 
/d. 
The Court referred to its earlier decision in Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 
(1849), in reaching this position. Luther arose from a controversy known as the Dorr's 
Rebellion of 1841, a brief and unsuccessful uprising in Rhode Island challenging the govern-
ment established under the original colonial charter. !d. at 34-37. The case technically 
was a trespass action brought by one Martin Luther against Luther Borden and others 
after martial law had been declared. Luther, arrested in his house, asserted that the 
established government had been displaced and that Borden had no authority to enter 
his home. /d. at 34-35. The question before the Court was whether the federal judiciary 
could determine which of the two competing Rhode Island governments was the lawful 
authority at the time. /d. at 39-45. 
Commentators have suggested that Luther v. Borden be applied narrowly ar1d not read 
to mean that all claims under the guarantee clause are nonjusticiable. See L. TRIBE, 
AMERICAN CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw 74 (1978); Bonfield, The Guarantee Clause of Article IV, 
Section 4: A Study in Constitutional Desuetude, 46 MINN. L. REv. 513, 534-35 (1962); Field, 
The Doctrine of Political Questions in the Federal Courts, 8 MINN. L. REv. 485, 507 (1924). 
36. Professor Bonfield has noted that: 
Since 1912 ... the Supreme Court has consistently refused to entertain on the 
merits any suit seeking to enforce the guarantee clause. On the basis of Pacific 
Telephone, it has denominated all issues raised under the clause nonjusticiable. This 
without any full consideration of the justification for its action, or possible distinc-
tions between the case before it and Pacific Telephone and Telegraph. 
Bonfield, supra note 35, at 556. 
37. Given the inefficacy of the guarantee clause to invalidate local plebiscites, it has 
been noted that "[i]nasmuch as the adoption of the initiative, referendum, and recall by 
many States some decades back appears not to have imperiled their standing with Con-
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Pacific States Telephone & Telegraph was issued by the Court on the 
same day as Kiernan v. Portland, another Oregon case. 38 In Kiernan, 
the Portland city council received an ·initiative petition requesting 
the construction of a bridge over the Willamette River; council subse-
quently submitted a charter amendment to the electorate. 39 After 
voter endorsement but before any action was taken, Kiernan, a tax-
payer, sued to enjoin the sale of the approved bonds designed to 
finance construction, claiming that the use of the initiative violated 
the guarantee clause. 40 The Court, again speaking through justice 
White, refused to invalidate the use of the local initiative, referring 
to ''the necessary operation and effect of the opinion in Pacific 
States.' ' 41 The Court thus reaffirmed that it would not overturn state 
and local legislative determinations based upon guarantee clause 
challenges. 42 
Finally, in Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrandt, the Supreme Court 
rebuffed a guarantee clause attack upon the Ohio system of con-
gressional redistricting that required citizen approval, by statewide 
referendum, of the legislature's decision to redistrictY Davis claimed 
that the referendum fell outside the state's legislative power and that 
its use in redistricting measures violated article I, section 4 of the 
federal Constitution. 44 Writing again for the Court, Justice White 
first deferred to the Supreme Court of Ohio's holding that the 
gress, it must be concluded that a considerable admixture of direct government does not 
make a government 'unrepublican. ''' E. CoRWIN, THE CoNSTITUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS 
ToDAY 266 (14th ed. 1978). 
38. 223 U.S. 151 (1912). 
39. !d. at 160 n.l. 
40. !d. at 162-63. 
41. !d. at 164. 
42. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217-29 (1962), once again discussed the justiciability 
doctrine, referring to the Pacific States line of cases with approval. Drawing from the Luther 
v. Borden precedent, Justice Brennan observed that one reason for the Court's reluctance 
to employ the guarantee clause as part of its judicial power was that the provision "is 
not a repository of judicially manageable standards which a court could utilize independently 
in order to identify a state's lawful government." !d. at 223. By refusing to delve into 
the meaning of the term ''republican form of government,'' the Court effectively limited 
its power to rectify perceived imbalances of political power and organization at the state 
and local level of government. Baker v. Carr also had the effect of declaring the guarantee 
clause to be a standarclless allocation of judicial power, unenforceable because of its potential 
breadth. Consequently, in this application, the nonjusticiability doctrine acts to restrain 
the Court. 
43. 241 U.S. 565, 566 (1916). Under the Ohio Constitution, voters could call for a 
referendum concerning any state law by obtaining the signatures of 6% of the voters on 
a petition. !d. · 
44. !d. at 567. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 provides in part: "The Times, Places, 
and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed 
in each State by the Legislature thereof .... " 
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referendum was. part of the state's legislative power; 45 he then 
reiterated the Pacific States Telephone & Telegraph nonjusticiability 
theory and refused to disturb the Ohio redistricting scheme. 
Although litigants persisted in raising the guarantee clause theory 
for a time, 46 this constitutional doctrine clearly has lapsed into a 
dormant state. It is important to note that, as a reflection of the 
Supreme Court's attitude regarding the referendum and.initiative, 
these cases reveal no antipathy towards the techniques themselves 
nor any hint that their use would constitute a denial of due process. 
The guarantee clause cases thus may be considered supportive of 
the referendum and initiative movement. 
2. The Referendum and the Right to Vote 
Once it is established that referenda and initiative decisionmaking 
is authorized by state law and does not violate the guarantee clause 
by creating a nonrepublican form of government, the focus then 
shifts to the issue of who can vote. As a general proposition, the 
Supreme Court has decreed that all citizens satisfying minimum 
age, residency or citizenship requirements47 are eligible to vote in 
both general elections for candidates and special elections for 
particular public issues. 48 Some states, however, have attempted to 
limit the voting franchise in the latter class of elections. 49 
45. 241 U.S. at 567-68. 
46. See, e.g., Highland Farms Dairy v. Agnew, 300 U.S. 608, 612 (1937) (attack on 
state law regulating dairy industry); Cochran v. Louisiana Bd. of Educ., 281 U.S. 370, 
374 (1930) (challenge to state tax that provided free school books); Ohio ex rei. Bryant 
v. Akron Metropolitan Park Dist., 281 U.S. 74, 79-80 (1930) (challenge to delegated power 
to create parks); Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U.S. 219, 234-35 (1917) 
(challenge to state statute creating workmen's compensation program funded by man-
datory contributions); O'Neill v. Leamer, 239 U.S. 244, 248 (1915) (review of Nebraska 
statute granting power to state court to organize and to manage drainage district); Marshall 
v. Dye, 231 U.S. 250, 256-57 (1913) (challenge to injunction against vote on proposed 
constitution following unconstitutional legislation). 
47. See Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 91 (1965) (States have power "to establish, 
on a nondiscriminatory basis, and in accordance with the Constitution ... qualifications 
for the exercise of the franchise.'') 
48. The Supreme Court has decided a series of cases examining the extent to which 
the voting franchise may be limited constitutionally. See, e.g., Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 
355 (1981); Town of Lockport v. Citizens for Community Action, 430 U.S. 259 (1977); 
Hill v. Stone, 421 U.S. 289 (1975); Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage 
Dist., 410 U.S. 719 (1973); City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970); Cipriano 
v. City of Hou111a, 395 U.S. 701 (1969) (mem.); Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 
395 U.S. 621 (1969); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
49. By way of background, the Supreme Court has recognized the fundamental con-
stitutional importance of the right to vote. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964). 
The Constitution, while acknowledging the role of the states in setting voting qualifica-
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In Kramer v. Union Free School District, the Court considered a New 
York statute that limited voting in school district elections to those 
residents and their spouses who either owned or leased taxable prop-
erty in the district, and to the parents or guardians of school 
children. 50 New Y ark considered its franchise restrictions necessary 
to restrict voting to those segments of the community that were 
"primarily interested" in school matters. 51 Because Kramer was 
denied his fundamental right to vote, the Supreme Court reviewed 
the New York statute using the equal protection strict scrutiny 
analysis. 52 The statutory voting limitation was invalidated because 
it did not select "interested" voters "with sufficient precision to 
justify denying appellant the franchise.'' 53 Notably, Kramer did not 
. conclude that all franchise restrictions were unconstitutional; rather, 
it forces state governments to meet a high standard of explanation 
when, by design, voting is limited to those persons most interested 
in or affected by a public decision. 
Cipriano v. City of Houma, a companion case, presented the Court. 
with a Louisiana statute that restricted the right to vote on the 
issuance of revenue bonds to those who owned taxable property. 54 
Cipriano brought a class action suit, on behalf of non-property-
owners, claiming that this statute violated the equal protection clause 
of the fourteenth amendment. 55 Louisiana asserted that property 
owners had a special interest in the bond referendum because the 
bonds were to finance municipally owned utilities, and because the 
quality of the utility service would affect property values. 56 Analogiz-
ing to Kramer, the Court found the franchise restriction to be un-
constitutional; there existed no compelling reason to limit voting 
rights to a specially interested class of people. 57 Both property owners 
tions and ordering the electoral process, contains specific limitations on those powers. 
Because the Reynolds Court found the right to vote to be fundamental in nature, the 
Court subsequently decided to subject state restrictions on that right to the "strict scrutiny" 
level of equal protection review. /d.; see Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 
621, 626 (1969) ("close and exacting examination"); see also Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355 
(1981 ); Town of Lockport v. Citizens for Community Action, 430 U.S. 259 (1977); Salyer 
Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719 (1973). 
50. 395 U.S. 621, 622-23 (1969). 
51. /d. at 631. 
52. /d. at 626. 
53. !d. at 632. 
54. 395 U.S. 701, 703 (1969) (mem.). 
55. /d. at 702-03. A three-judge panel at the district court level held the law constitu-
tional. Cipriano v. City of Houma, 286 F. Supp. 823, 828 (E.D. La. 1968), rev'd, 395 
U.S. 701, 707 (1969). Cipriano brought a direct appeal to the Supreme Court under 28 
U.S.C. § 1253. 395 U.S. at 704. 
56. 395 U.S. at 704. 
57. /d. 
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and non-owners used the city's utilities and paid the rates; thus, 
the Court reasoned that both had a common interest in the benefits 
and burdens of the system. 58 In its next judicial term the Supreme Court considered City of 
Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, in which property-owner voting restrictions, 
as applied to the issuance of municipal general obligation bonds, 
were challenged. 59 Arizona law provided that only real property tax-
payers could vote in bond referenda. 60 The city attempted to 
distinguish Cipriano on the ground that general obligation bonds were 
involved and that real property taxes serviced those securities. 61 
Justice White, writing for the majority, concluded that the difference 
in the interests of property owners and non-owners was not substan-
tial enough to justify the franchise limitation. 62 All residents of 
Phoenix would have an interest in the sewers, parks and public 
buildings to be built with the bond proceeds. Moreover, Justice 
White stated that "[p ]resumptively, when all citizens are affected 
58. !d. The non-owners, as ratepayers, were interested in the issuance of debt because 
the utility's bonds would be retired not by property taxes but rather by rates derived by 
operation of the utilities. /d. at 705 & n.6. The Court found that the Louisiana law allowed 
some interested voters to participate in the bond referendum but excluded other equally 
affected citizens. /d. at 705-06. This selective distribution of the franchise, therefore, did 
not meet the strict standards established in Kramer for constitutional limitation on voting. 
Kramer, 395 U.S. at 625-30. 
Unable to predict the result in Kramer, Louisiana apparently had argued that there 
was a rational basis between its statute and a legitimate governmental interest. See Cipriano, 
395 U.S. at 706. This showing was insufficient to satisfy the "exacting standard of preci-
sion" required by the Court. /d. at 706 (quoting Kramer, 395 U.S. at 632). However, 
Justices Black and Stewart, in their concurrences, found the voting classification" 'whol-
ly irrelevant to achievement' of the State's objective." /d. at 707 (Black and Stewart, 
JJ., concurring). To these justices, the Louisiana scheme apparently would not have 
satisfied even the rational basis test. See id. 
In Cipriano, the Court reserved the question of whether ''in some circumstances, [the 
state may] constitutionally limit the franchise to qualified voters who are also 'specially 
interested' in the election.'' /d. at 704. Referring to the Kramer decision, the Court noted 
that a law limiting voting rights would be tested for equal protection violations on the 
basis of "whether all those excluded are in fact substantially less interested or affected 
than those the statute includes." /d. (quoting Kramer, 395 U.S. at 632). The Court finally 
would uphold such a voting rights restriction in Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355 (1981). 
59. 399 U.S. 204 (1970). General obligation municipal bonds are secured by the general . 
taxing authority of the issuer. Municipal issuers traditionally have raised revenues by way 
of the local real property tax imposed upon the ownership of land and improvements. 
Revenue bonds, on the other hand, are debt instruments secured entirely or partially by 
the revenues generated by the improvement constructed with the bond proceeds. These 
securities usually are not secured by the general taxing power of the issuer. See 15 E. 
McQuiLLIN, THE LAw OF MuNICIPAL CoRPORATIONS§ 43.34 (3d ed. 1970); 0. REYNOLDS, 
supra note 16, § 104. 
60. 399 U.S. at 206 & n.2. 
61. /d. at 208. 
62. /d. at 209. 
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in important ways by a governmental decision subject to a referen-
dum, the Constitution does not permit weighted voting or the ex-
clusion of otherwise qualified citizens from the franchise. " 63 
Despite City of Phoenix's strong statement, the Supreme Court soon 
began to retreat from its sweeping policy requiring broad voter par-
ticipation in local decisionmaking. 64 The Court first upheld a system 
of limited franchise in Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage 
District. 65 California authorized the formation of water storage 
districts that could plan and execute projects for the conservation 
and distribution of water. 66 The directors of the water district were 
chosen through general elections in which only landowners were 
permitted to vote. In addition, voting rights were apportioned 
according to the value of each voter's landY Asserting that they 
had a substantial interest in the management of the water district, 
voters excluded from water district elections challenged the constitu-
tionality of the state statute,. claiming that it violated their rights 
under the equal protection clause. 68 
Speaking through Justice Rehnquist, the Court refused to extend 
the Kramer line of reasoning to the case at bar. 69 The general rule 
favoring full electoral participation was rejected on the grounds that 
the water district served a limited rather than general purpose, and 
that its operations had a disproportionate impact upon residents who 
owned land. 70 The Court emphasized that the water district system 
63. !d. 
64. The obligation to apply one person-one vote principles to state elections sprang 
from the Court's decision in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). Avery v. Midland 
County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968), extended the Reynolds rationale to the election of county 
officials but reserved decision on its application to "a special-purpose unit of government 
assigned the performance of functions affecting definable groups of constituents more than 
other constituents." /d. at 483-84. The Kramer, Cipriano and City of Phoenix decisions all 
reserved the question of whether the voting franchise could be limited constitutionally 
to a restricted segment of the electorate. In these cases, the Court had not. ruled out the 
possibility that in certain instances some citizens might have a special interest in public 
or quasi-public matters that should give them complete control over important decisions. 
65. 410 u.s. 719 (1973). 
66. /d. at 723-24. 
67. /d. at 724-25. 
68. /d. at 726. A three-judge panel at the district court level had upheld both the 
franchise restriction and the provision for weighted voting. Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare 
Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 342 F. Supp. 144, 146 (E.D. Cal. 1972), aff'd, 410 U.S. 
719, 735 (1973). 
69. 410 U.S. at 728. Interestingly, the Court also rejected the heightened scrutiny 
equal protection analysis of the California statute that had been used in the Kramer line 
of cases. /d. at 730-31. At no point in the Salyer opinion did Justice Rehnquist explain 
why the compelling state interest analysis had been abandoned. 
70. /d. at 728. 
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physically benefited land in the district and directly imposed finan-
cial burdens only upon landowners. 71 
Salyer, then, represents an initial excursion from the general prin-
ciples of one ·person-one vote recognized in Kramer. Although that 
theory of uniform voting rights remains intact, 72 the Court subse-
quently has defined those circumstances when referendum voting 
may be curtailed. 73 
Hill v. Stone considered the Texas dual voting-box scheme for local 
bond referenda. 74 Persons who had listed property for taxation voted 
in one box; all other eligible voters placed their ballots in another. 
A bond referendum passed only if it received both an overall majority 
and a majority of the taxpayers, effectively giving property owners 
veto power over the bond referenda in the state. 75 
In a rather striking turnabout, the Court reestablished its sup-
port for broad-based voting rights and thus invalidated the Texas 
practice. After reviewing its decisions in Kramer, Cipriano and City 
of Phoenix, Justice Marshall wrote that the principle to be derived 
from that line of cases was that ''any classification restricting the 
franchise on grounds other than residence, age, and citizenship can-
not stand unless the district or State can demonstrate that the 
7l. !d. at 729. Once the limited franchise principle was accepted by the Court, the 
next logical step-weighted voting-naturally followed. In his dissent, Justice Douglas 
was concerned especially about the effects of allowing political representation based on 
wealth or corporate land holdings. He found it foreign to the American tradition that 
corporations should be admitted to the franchise. /d. at 741 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
Justice Douglas perceived a danger from corporate domination of the individual, noting 
that "[o]ne corporation can outvote 77 individuals in this district. Four corporations can 
exercise these governmental powers as they choose, leaving every individual inhabitant 
with a weak, ineffective voice. The result is a corporate political kingdom undreamed 
of by those who wrote our Constitution." /d. at 742. It is difficult to imagine what would 
have been Justice Douglas's reaction to the Court's decision in Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 
355 (1981). See infra note 79. 
72. In a companion case to Salyer, the Supreme Court upheld a Wyoming statute per-
mitting the formation and operation of a watershed improvement district by sole vote 
of area landowners. Associated Enter. v. Toltec Watershed Improvement Dist., 410 U.S. 
743 (1973) (per curiam) (weighted voting allowed). 
73. Salyer has received generally unfavorable review from academic writers. See, e.g., 
J. NowAK, R. RoTUNDA &J. YouNG, HANDBOOK ON CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw 637 (2d ed. 
1978); L. TRIBE, supra note 35, at 765. 
74. 421 u.s. 289, 292 (1975). 
75. /d. The city of Fort Worth had employed this technique for city' transportation 
improvements and library construction. /d. The library bond issue failed because it did 
not receive the requisite majority vote from the property owners. /d. at 292-93. A lower 
federal court decision invalidated this practice and enjoined its further application. Stone 
v. Stovall, 377 F. Supp. 1016, 1024 (N.D. Tex. 1974), aff'd sub nom. Hill v. Stone, 421 
U.S. 289, 302 (.1975). 
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classification serves a compelling state interest.' ' 76 The Court fur-
ther developed the dichotomy between general and special interest 
elections, placing municipal bond referenda in the former category 
and therefore subject to a full community vote. 77 This opinion makes 
it clear that property ownership cannot be the sole qualification for 
participation in local government debt financing decisions. 78 
In distinguishing the Kramer line of decisions from Salyer, a number 
of points appear consistent. The Kramer cases all involved questions 
concerning the provision of services enjoyed by the public as a 
whole-for example, parks, transit, schools and libraries. These kinds 
of benefits traditionally had been available to residents of urban and 
suburban areas and did not pertain directly to the use of land within 
the jurisdiction. In Salyer, the election involved a limited purpose 
organization with narrow functions directly related to the economic 
development of land in a primarily agricultural district. The 
organization, although technically governmental in origin, appeared 
to represent, in the Court's view, a voluntary association of land-
owners. This characterization of the communal action in support 
of economic self-interest persuaded the Court to find an exception 
to the Reynolds v. Sims principle lauding the right to vote. 79 
76. !d. at 297. The Court readily embraced the strict scrutiny standard of equal pro-
tection review as the test to be applied in franchise restrictions cases, notably absent from 
the Court's holding in Salyer two years earlier. See id. Justice Marshall concluded that 
"the state interests proffered by appellant and the city officials fall far short of meeting 
the 'compelling state interest' test consistently applied in Kramer, Cipriano and Phoenix." 
/d. at 301. 
77. /d. at 298-301. Considering the Court's holding in Cipriano and City of Phoenix, 
it is odd that the Court granted certiorari for the Hill case. The factual similarities are 
striking, but perhaps the Court wished to reaffirm its earlier line of holdings after issuing 
the Salyer decision. In fact, the Hill Court relegated its discussion of Salyer to a footnote 
reference. See id. at 295 n.5. 
78. Compare Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 ( 1966) (" [A] State 
violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment whenever it makes 
affluence of the voter or payment of any fee an electoral standard."). 
79. See 377 U.S. 533 (1964). This idea was later confirmed in Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 
355 (1981). Justice Stewart noted that "though the state legislature has allowed water 
districts to become nominal public entities in order to obtain less expensive bond financing, 
the districts remain essentially business enterprises, created by and chiefly benefiting a 
specific group of landowners." /d. at 368. 
Following Hill v. Stone, the Supreme Court surprisingly approved franchise limitations 
in two subsequent cases. The first case, Town of Lockport v. Citizens for Community Action, 
involved a provision of New York's constitution and municipal home rule law specifying 
that a county charter or amendment would become effective only if a majority of city 
voters and a separate majority of non-city voters gave their approval. 430 U.S. 259, 260-61 
& nn.1 & 2 (1977). Consequently, this dual majority system gave both city and non-city 
voters a veto power over county charter proposals. Town of Lockport-differs from the prior 
decisions discussed in that it focuses not upon the right of citizens to vote, but rather 
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3. Cases Examining Referendum Results 
Often plebiscites have provided law on matters that legislative 
bodies had declined to decide. As a result, issues of significant public 
interest have been decided by the technique of direct legislation. 
In 1967, the Supreme Court decided the first of a series offour cases 
that tested the substantive results of initiatives and referenda against 
the due process and equal protection requirements of the fourteenth 
the effectiveness of votes once they are cast. The Supreme Court upheld the New York 
dual majority system by noting the different interests of city and non-city voters in reordering 
the structure of county government. /d. at 268-69. The Town of Lockport Court upheld 
a referendum system that not only accepted the vote of all eligible voters within the jurisdic-
tion but gave one segment of the community a controlling power of rejection. The non-
majoritarian control aspect of this holding may be of special significance to zoning referenda 
litigation employing "ward veto" features. See infra note 211 and accompanying text. Town 
of Lockport is consistent with the Salyer decision in at least one respect-that is, the preser-
vation of political power in a portion of the total electorate. Yet this reservation of non-
majoritarian control in Town of Lockport appears considerably less open to abuse than the 
situation in Salyer. 
The most recent Supreme Court case in this area is Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355 (1981 ). 
Under the challenged statutory scheme, only landowners could vote for directors of an 
organization formed to store and deliver water to landowners in a particular district; voting 
power was apportioned according to each landowner's acreage. !d. at 359. Non-landowners 
living in the district challenged the constitutionality of the acreage-based franchise limita-
tion by analogizing the functions of the water district to those of a general purpose govern-
ment. It was asserted that electricity sales affected all residents, regardless of property 
ownership. !d. at 360. The plaintiffs also alleged that, through its water management, 
the district could significantly affect flood control and environmental conditions. /d. 
Although the Court agreed that the Salt River district provided a more diverse range 
of services than its counterpart in Salyer, it did not find this difference to have constitu-
tional significance. !d. at 366. Writing for the five-justice majority in Ball, Justice Stewart 
adopted a narrow view of the water district's functions, finding them limited enough to 
avoid the "strict demands of Reynolds [v. Sims]." !d. 
Of even greater significance is Justice Stewart's total rejection of a public impact analysis 
as a means of determining whether voting restrictions will be upheld. See id. at 370. The 
fact that the Salt River district supplied significant amounts of electrical power to nearly 
half of the citizens of Arizona, issued tax exempt debt instruments, exercised eminent 
domain and taxing powers and controlled water resources within a nearly quarter of a 
million acre region did not convince the Court's majority that non-voting citizens were 
being denied equal protection. The focus clearly was not on what the majority perceived 
as incidental beneficiaries of the water district system but rather on ''the disproportionate 
relationship the District's functions bear to the specific class of people whom the system 
makes eligible to vote." /d. This latter group now can be identified in state legislation 
and empowered to control a limited range of issues. 
The Court's willingness to restrict the franchise in Salyer and Ball is attributable to 
its narrow view regarding the community-wide impact of the special district decisions. 
It is conceivable that future cases may find other special governmental decisions insulated 
from general electoral control. However, so long as the methods of land use control re-
main a function of general purpose government, referendum decisions will remain open 
to the full voting community. 
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amendment. These cases were similar in one additional respect: they 
considered housing and land use issues. A brief review of these opin-
ions reveals the development of the Court's acceptance of plebiscite 
decisionmaking at the state and local level of government. 
Reitman v. Mulkey involved a federal equal protection challenge 
to a California constitutional provision, adopted by initiative vote, 
prohibiting the state, or its agencies, from restricting residential land-
owners from selling or leasing real property to the buyer of their 
choice. 80 The question presented to the Supreme Court was whether 
such a voter-initiated constitutional amendment constituted illegal 
state action in contravention of the fourteenth amendment. Justice 
White concluded for the majority that considering the purpose of 
the amendment-to forbid the state from interfering with the rights 
of sellers and lessors to discriminate-the Supreme Court of Califor-
nia was correct in finding a federal constitutional defect. 81 
Reitman's importance lies in its extension of fourteenth amend-
ment theory to find invidious racial discrimination in less than direct 
or affirmative state action. 82 Justice White considered constitutional 
amendment by plebiscite equal to more conventional methods of 
lawmaking. Moreover, the majority expanded the judicial role to 
include not only a consideration of the explicit state activity but also 
an assessment of the potential impact of the official action upon a 
segment of the population. 83 Here, the effect of the California in-
80. 387 U.S. 369 (1967). The initiative proposed adoption of the following amend-
ment to the California constitution: 
Neither the State nor any subdivision or agency thereof shall deny, limit or 
abridge, directly or indirectly, the right of any person, who is willing or desires 
to sell, lease or rent any part or all of his real property, to decline to sell, lease 
or rent such property to such person or persons as he, in his absolute discretion, 
chooses. 
/d. at 371. This initiative was overwhelmingly adopted by a vote of 4,526,460 to 2,395, 747. 
/d. at 388. 
81. !d. at 373-81. 
82. The majority in Reitman may have been concerned especially about the effect of 
the amendment upon the ability of minority groups to seek relief from the state legislature 
for real property discrimination matters. If § 26 had been upheld against fourteenth 
amendment attack, political recourse against private discrimination would have been an 
impossibility. This potential restriction upon available. political processes might have been 
extremely influential. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 
( 1938). Recently, the Court has reaffirmed the idea that the equal protection clause 
"guarantees racial minorities the right to full participation in the political life of the com-
munity'' by preventing subtle distortions of governmental structure that impose ''special 
burdens on the ability of minority groups to achieve beneficial legislation." Washington 
v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 467 (1982). 
83. This precarious search for illicit voter intention has been. carried forward to the 
present day. See Crawford v. Board of Educ., 458 U.S. 527, 539 n.21 (1982). 
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itiative would have been to prevent the state from devising and im-
plementing fair housing regulations. 84 Reitman demonstrates the 
Court's willingness to strike down a popularly generated social policy 
position adversely affecting important interests of minority citizens. 
It is not inconceivable that a similar attack might be aimed at 
exclusionary zoning schemes adopted by referendum or initiative. 
Although later Supreme Court opinions have made it more difficult 
to assert successful constitutionally based discrimination claims, 85 
under the proper factual setting Reitman could serve as a basis of 
challenging exclusionary practices. 
Two years after Reitman, the Supreme Court considered Hunter 
v. Erickson, in which procedures to enforce a local fair housing 
ordinance were challenged. 86 Hunter attempted to file a complaint 
under certain antidiscrimination provisions relating to housing but 
was informed that the city charter had been amended; any ordinance 
regulating fair housing matters now required approval, by a majority 
of voters at a referendum, before it could take effect. 87 The amend-
ment also voided preexisting antidiscrimination legislation. 88 Because 
the fair housing ordinance Hunter tried to enforce had not been 
so approved, the city considered it ineffective by operation of the 
charter amendment. 89 
The majority rejected the city's assertion that the charter provi-
sion was merely ''a public decision to move slowly in a delicate area 
of race relations.' ' 90 The Court viewed this ratification requirement 
to be constitutionally impermissible because of its selective applica-
tion to a limited subject matter-an ordinance opposing racial and 
religious discrimination in housing-and of the probable negative 
effect upon the ordinances being reviewed. 91 As in Reitman, the ele-
ment of direct participatory democracy did not insulate the man-
datory referendum practice from strict scrutiny equal protection 
analysis and appropriate invalidation. Justice White noted that "[t]he 
84. See 387 U.S. at 377. 
85. See Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 
(1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-48 (1976). These decisions reflect the 
position that even when a neutral law has a disproportionate racial impact, a fourteenth 
amendment violation is found only if a discriminatory purpose can be shown. 
86. 393 u.s. 385 (1969). 
87. !d. at 387. 
88. See id. The Court declined to hold that the repeal of anti-discrimination laws, 
standing alone, violated the fourteenth amendment. !d. at 390 n.5; see also Crawford v. 
Board of Educ., 458 U.S. 527, 539-40 (1982). 
89. 393 U.S. at 388. 
90. !d. at 392. 
91. !d. at 390. 
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sovereignty of the people is itself subject to those constitutional limita-
tions which have been duly adopted and remain unrepealed.' ' 92 
A third decision in the Reitman line of cases upheld a mandatory 
referendum requirement applied to the development of government-
sponsored, low income housing projects. Injames v. Valtierra, Califor-
nia had adopted a constitutional provision demanding that a com-
munity referendum ratify any decision to proceed with a ''low-rent 
housing project.' ' 93 Citizens in California localities rejecting sub-
sidized housing proposals challenged the state constitutional provi-
sion in federal court. 
The Court, in a brief opinion written by Justice Black, concluded 
that the mandatory referendum technique did not violate the equal 
protection clause. Justice Black distinguished Hunter from the facts 
at hand by noting that the California constitution did not create 
separate classifications based upon race, 94 but only upon wealth. 
This difference was of critical importance to the logic of the 
decision. 95 Avoiding any form of disproportionate impact analysis, 
Justice Black found the constitutional provision to be a race-neutral 
device supported by reasonable public purposes. 96 Because the 
California system applied the referendum technique only to low in-
come housing developments, the wealth-related classifications did 
not necessitate judicial review under the strict scrutiny level of equal 
protection analysis. 
james v. Valtierra is the first modern case in which the Court 
accorded state referendum and initiative schemes broad respect as 
illustrations of direct democracy. Injustice Black's view, "[p]rovi-
sions for referendums demonstrate devotion to democracy, not to 
92. Irj. at 392. 
93. 402 U.S. 137, 139 n.2 (1971). The California constitution had been amended 
because the state supreme court had barred local referenda on low income housing pro-
posals, believing that they constituted non-legislative acts and thus were outside of the 
scope of the referendum power. See Housing Auth. v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. 2d 550, 
557-58, 219 P.2d 457, 460-61 (1950). 
94. 402 U.S. at 141. 
95. The mandatory referral ordinance in Hunter v. Erickson was similar structurally 
to the constitutionally based system found in James v. Valtierra, 393 U.S. 385 (1969). 
In Hunter, however, the referendum requirement applied to fair housing ordinances with 
the explicit goal of dealing with racial discrimination. This element triggered the applica-
tion of the equal protection strict scrutiny analysis. In Valtierra, the state constitutional 
provision in question nominally affected only low income persons. The Valtierra Court 
refused to extend the Hunter analysis and result to the facts before it. See 402 U.S. at 141. 
96. Justice Black emphasized that the referendum procedure provided the general 
citizenry a method to have "a voice" in local fiscal and land development matters. 402 
U.S. at 143. Without directly stating it, Justice Black assumed that these were reasonable 
objectives for government to have; they were, therefore, constitutionally acceptable. 
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bias, discrimination, or prejudice.' ' 97 This idea that local plebiscites 
represent a form of majoritarian decisionmaking, deserving of judicial 
approval, had its inception in Valtierra and was carried forward in 
City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises. 98 By eliminating the racial 
issue from the context of the decision, the Valtierra Court gave strong 
support to the mandatory referendum as a structure for local govern-
ment law and policymaking. 
C. The Eastlake Case 
1. State Court Consideration 
In City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, the Supreme Court of 
the United States first considered a constitutional challenge to the 
practice of subjecting local rezoning decisions to a mandatory referen-
dum approval. 99 The Court held that a local charter provision of 
this type did not violate federal constitutional due process 
guarantees. 100 
The facts of the case were uncomplicated. Forest City Enterprises, 
a real estate developer, sought to rezone an eight-acre parcel of land, 
previously classified for limited industrial use, to build a high-rise, 
multifamily apartment building. 101 Following existing procedures, 
the Eastlake, Ohio Planning Commission recommended approval 
of the land use modification to the city counciP 02 Prior to council's 
action, however, the citizens of Eastlake amended the city charter 
to require that any land use change adopted by council would not 
become effective until it was ratified by fifty-five percent of the voters 
in a referendum. 103 Council then approved the requested rezoning 
proposal; but when the developer applied for the necessary parking 
and yard permit, the planning commission denied its request because 
the Eastlake voters had not ratified council's rezoning decision. 104 
While Forest City's suit for declaratory judgment was pending, the 
Eastlake voters considered and disapproved the rezoning request. 105 
Dissatisfied by the referendum result, Forest City would not be 
comforted by the holding of the trial court. In a brief opinion, the 
97. !d. at 141. 
98. See 426 U.S. 668, 672-74 (1976). 
99. 426 u.s. 668 (1976). 
100. !d. at 679. 
101. !d. at 670. 
102. !d. 
103. !d. at 670 n.l. 
104. !d. at 670-71. 
105. !d. at 671. 
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Ohio Court of Common Pleas upheld the charter and found no im-
proper retroactive application of the Eastlake referendum require-
ment to Forest City .106 The trial court cloaked the Eastlake charter 
provision with a presumption of validity, and that presumption was 
not overcome by the evidence presented by Forest City .107 In 
retrospect, the decision did not discuss seriously any of the legal 
challenges raised to the Eastlake charter, but it did conclude with 
a simple statement that masked the complexity of the issues presented 
by the case. Judge Clair wrote that "[t]he Court makes no com-
ment on the wisdom of what appears to be a cumbersome method 
of changing zoning to meet changing times. " 108 
Forest City appealed the trial court's decision, and the issue before 
the appellate court bore no similarity to those argued below. The 
appellant maintained that the Eastlake charter provision requiring 
mandatory zoning referenda was unconstitutional because it omitted 
certain procedural requisites demanded both by the state constitu-
tion and statutes. 109 For the appellate court, Judge Cook ruled that 
this technical challenge failed because state law anticipated expansion 
of referendum and initiative rights through the adoption of particular 
charter provisions. Therefore, the Eastlake charter did not conflict 
with article II, section 1f of the Ohio constitution and was a valid 
exercise of referendum power. 110 Without any mention of the varied 
106. The trial court's ruling indicated that there had been no improper delegation of 
city council's legislative functions and no denial of due process for failure to provide the 
voters with meaningful decisionmaking standards. Both the trial and appellate court opin-
ions were not reported formally but were obtained from the appendices of the petitioner's 
brief before the Supreme Court of the United States. See Petition for and Writ of Cer-
tiorari at 45-47 (Appendix C) (Court of Common Pleas) & Brief for Appellant at 39-44 
(Appendix B) (Court of Appeals), City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enter., 426 U.S. 668 
(1976) [hereinafter cited as Petition]. 
It is difficult to know precisely which arguments were made at the trial court level 
because Judge Clair's opinion does not establish clearly the claims made. Occasionally, 
partially described assertions were dismissed without discussion, thereby escaping analysis. 
107. This traditional presumption of validity of municipal ordinances allocates the burden 
of proof to the challenger in a suit to invalidate the local legislation. See 4 R. ANDERSON, 
supra note 2, § 25.26; P. RoHAN, ZoNING AND LAND UsE CoNTROLS § 52.09[2] (1979). 
108. Petition, supra note 106, at 47. Perhaps judge Clair viewed the Eastlake charter 
provision as merely a procedural obstacle engrafted on to the traditional rezoning method. 
109. !d. at 40-43. Precisely, the issue was whether the mandatory referendum device 
attached to zoning actions violated an Ohio statute requiring that referenda be preceded 
by a signed petition of 10% of the voters at the prior gubernatorial election. The court 
of appeals concluded that a charter municipality need not comply with that procedure 
if its charter creates a different method for conducting a referendum. !d. at 42-43; see 
State ex ret. Bramblette v. Yordy, 24 Ohio St. 2d 147, 150, 265 N.E.2d 273, 275 (1970) 
(municipality may narrow scope of constitutional gra,nt of referendum authority by 
specifying types of measures to which a referendum may be directed). 
110. Petition, supra note 106, at 41-42. See infra note 114 for the pertinent text of the 
state constitution. 
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legal arguments raised below, the court of appeals affirmed the trial 
court, and the case proceeded to the state supreme court. 
By the time Forest City's appeal reached the Supreme Court of 
Ohio, it was clear that the constitutionality of the Eastlake charter 
provision under federal law would be the primary issue for con-
sideration. In a five-two decision, the state supreme court reversed 
the lower court rulings, holding instead that the mandatory referen-
dum device denied Forest City property rights without due process 
of law, a violation of the fourteenth amendment. 111 This holding 
stood briefly as a victory for landowners against the practice of 
automatic referral of all proposed land use changes to the 
community's voters for approval. It also represented a significant 
reversal oflongstanding state law favoring the broad use of plebiscites 
to establish and to redirect local governmental policies. 112 
The court commenced its consideration of Forest City's appeal 
in much the same way as the Supreme Court of the United States 
would a year later; it began by classifying rezoning as a legislative 
act and therefore subject to the referendum process. 113 Such a step 
was necessary because the Ohio constitution explicitly limited 
municipal referendum power to legislative matters. 114 Justice Brown, 
writing for the majority, properly employed the traditional method 
in classifying the eight-acre rezoning proposal in Eastlake. No attempt 
was made to examine the judicially imposed label of ''legislative 
act" attached to the rezoning. 115 Under the terms of the Eastlake 
111. Forest City Enter. v. City of Eastlake, 41 Ohio St. 2d 187, 198,324 N.E.2d 740, 
747-48 (1975), rev'd, 426 U.S. 668 (1976). 
112. In general, the Ohio courts have interpreted the referendum and initiative provi-
sion of the state constitution to favor the exercise of the referendum right and the objec-
tives sought under it. See, e.g., State ex rel. Middletown v. City Comm., 140 Ohio St. 
368, 44 N.E.2d 459 (1942), cited in Hilltop Realty, Inc. v. South Euclid, 110 Ohio App. 
535, 164 N.E.2d 180 (1960) and Merryman v. Gorman, 117 N.E.2d 629 (Ct. Common 
Pleas 1953). 
113. 41 Ohio St. 2d at 189-90, 324 N.E.2d at 743; see City of Eastlake v. Forest City 
Enter., 426 U.S. 668, 673-74 (1976). 
114. Article II, section 1f of the Ohio Constitution provides:' "The initiative and referen-
dum powers are hereby reserved to the people of each municipality on all questions which 
such municipalities may now or hereafter be authorized by law to control by legislative 
action; such powers shall be exercised in the manner now or hereafter provided by law." 
9HIO CoNsT. art. II, § 1f (emphasis added). 
115. Justice Stevens, in his dissent to the Supreme Court ruling in Eastlake, cited deci-
sions of the supreme courts of Oregon and Washington that had looked behind the 
legislative/administrative labels and concluded that the traditional classifications and subse-
quent implications regarding judicial review need not be followed; the essence of par-
ticular rezonings was adjudication to which procedural due process rights should apply. 
426 U.S. at 684-85 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Fasano v. Board of County Comm'rs, 
264 Or. 574, 580-81, 507 P.2d 23, 26 (1973); Fleming v. City of Tacoma, 81 Wash. 
2d 292, 298-99, 502 P.2d 327, 331 (1972)). \ 
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charter, ''any change in the existing land uses or any change what-
soever to any ordinance" affecting land use were to be reviewed 
first by the planning commission and later approved by the city coun-
cil, followed by a fifty-five percent favorable vote of the electorate. 116 
The effect of the charter was to subject all land use changes to the 
mandatory referendum and not just those characterized as legislative 
acts. 117 This overinclusiveness in applying the referendum require-
ment to administrative actions not only violated the express provi-
sions of the Ohio constitution but also reflected the intent of the 
Eastlake voters to control directly all deviations from the preexisting 
zoning structure. Relying upon a past decision, the state supreme 
court struck down this attempted extension of mandatory referen-
da to administrative acts. 118 
The court then embarked upon its most significant task-that 
is, determining whether the Eastlake mandatory referendum system 
denied the landowner rights protected by the due process clause of 
the federal Constitution. 119 The court's due process inquiry was not 
116. The charter provision is reprinted at 426 U.S. at 686 n.B (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
11 7. The language of the Eastlake charter was so expansive that it could have required 
all land use changes to be first considered by the planning commission and then subject 
to a vote by council. Depending upon the meaning given to the term "change to the 
existing land use," variances, special use permits, rezonings and other changes conceivably 
could have been subject to the elaborate approval procedure established in the charter. 
Undoubtedly, this would have discouraged any land development requiring even a slight 
variation from the existing zoning rules. A survey of Ohio municipalities revealed other 
overinclusive charter and ordinance provisions, similar to those litigated in Eastlake, in 
existence long after that decision. See infra note 210. 
118. See Myers v. Schiering, 27 Ohio St. 2d 11, 271 N.E.2d 864 (1971). In Myers, 
the court held that a city council's granting of a permit for the operation of a sanitary 
landfill-pursuant to a local zoning' ordinance-constituted an administrative act not subject 
to voluntary referendum proceeding. In this case, as in the Eastlake charter provision, 
the city council-normally a legislative body-was acting in an administrative capacity 
by executing or administering a law already in existence. In Myers, the connection of the 
council-issued permit to the zoning code was determinative. 27 Ohio St. 2d at 14, 271 
N.E.2d at 866. In Eastlake, the expansion of the referendum requirement to acts tradi-
tionally characterized as administrative facilitated the same result. 
119. 41 Ohio St. 2d at 191-96, 324 N.E.2d at 744-46. With the hindsight of Chief 
Justice Burger's opinion in Eastlake, it now appears that Justice Brown would have been 
wise to articulate a state constitutional law theory of due process underlying his decision 
to strike down the Eastlake procedure. Had the state supreme court made the same 
arguments in defense of landowners' rights under the rubric of state constitutional law, 
the Supreme Court probably would not have had grounds to reverse. There is, of course, 
no reason why principles of state constitutional law may not be more protective of in-
dividual rights than their federal counterparts. See State v. Kaluna, 55 Hawaii 361, 369 
n.6, 520 P.2d 51, 58 n.6 (1974). Indeed, Justice Brennan has suggested that state con-
stitutional provisions need not mirror federal law and, further, that state law ought to 
retain it~ own vitality as a separate source of protective constitutional principle. See Bren-
nan, State Constitutions and the Protections of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REv. 489, 498-502 
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focused upon the substantive result of the Eastlake practice; rather, 
the Ohio opinion examined the more intriguing question of whether 
the city's procedure denied Forest City Enterprises the right to a 
decision made by a "responsible organ of municipal government. " 120 
Although Justice Brown attempted to define a due process standard 
for the method of land use decisionmaking, in the end, he simply 
summarily concluded that Eastlake's mandatory referendum system 
''clearly violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.'' 121 
Instead of focusing upon violations of specific procedural due pro-
cess rights, the court grounded its opinion on an improper delega-
tion theory modelled after the Supreme Court's decision in 
Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge. 122 Justice Brown 
reasoned that to subject local government legislative acts to referen-
dum approval constituted an unlawful delegation of a city's legislative 
authority. Given that Eastlake derived its municipal power from 
the people and that the Ohio constitution expressly reserved the right 
of plebiscite to Ohio citizens, 123 the court's delegation analysis was 
particular! y un persuasive. 
Linking a constitutional due process violation with the Roberge 
theory of unlawful delegation confused the issue. Plainly applica-
(1977). As an admonition to both the state judiciary and to attorneys, Justice Brennan 
adds this further comment: 
[S]tate courts cannot rest when they have afforded their citizens the full protec-
tions of the federal Constitution. State constitutions, too, are a font of individual • 
liberties, their protections often extending beyorid those required by the Supreme 
Court's interpretation offederallaw. The legal revolution which has brought federal 
law to the fore must not be allowed to inhibit the independent protective force 
of state law-for without it, the full realization of our liberties cannot be guaranteed. 
!d. at 491. The Ohio supreme court lost an opportunity to establish such an independent 
course in the Eastlake case. Interestingly, in California, voters have adopted a constitu-
tional provision specifying that "(r]ights guaranteed by this Constitution are not depen-
dent on those guaranteed by the United States Constitution." CAL. CoNST. art. I, § 24. 
120. 41 Ohio St. 2d at 196, 324 N.E.2d at 746. 
121. /d. The Ohio court apparently never measured the Eastlake procedure against 
anything other than a federal due process standard. In a rather superficial fashion, Justice 
Brown concluded that Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 
116 (1926), was most similar factually to the matter at bar and therefore controlling. 41 
Ohio St. 2d at 195-96, 324 N.E.2d at 746. The court's effort to distinguish the Supreme 
Court's decision in James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1970), also was unsatisfactory. See 
41 Ohio St. 2d at 196-98, 324 N.E.2d at 747. The state supreme court believed that the 
Valtierra referendum was acceptable because it raised an issue of ''community-wide policy-
making"-that is, the approval of low income public housing. !d. at 197, 324 N.E.2d 
at 747. But the court never explained adequately why·a community vote on matters of 
narrower application should be constitutionally impermissible. 
122. 41 Ohio St. 2d at 194-96, 324 N.E.2d at 746; see Roberge, 278 U.S. 116 (1928). 
123. See OHio CoNsT. art. II, § 1. 
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tion of Roberge was inapposite. The Supreme Court of Ohio 
misconstrued the Roberge rationale underlying the fourteenth amend-
ment due process violation. Under the Roberge facts, the Supreme 
Court was concerned with the delegation of complete land use con-
trol power to an extremely narrow segment of the community-
those property owners living within four hundred feet of a proposed 
philanthropic home. 124 The Eastlake case, however, presented a 
localized decision subject ~o confirmation by the entire community. 
The Roberge Court bristled at the exclusionary effect the ordinance 
before it would have: it not only would permit a small number of 
citizens to prevent construction of a socially beneficial structure, 
but it also would have precluded any judicial intervention. 125 The 
124. 278 U.S. at 118. Justice Butler, speaking for the Roberge majority, clearly was 
offended by what he perceived as the exclusion of a socially important activity by a small 
group of determined neighbors. He noted that: 
The section [of the Seattle ordinance] purports to give the owners of less than 
one-half of the land within 400 feet of the proposed building authority-uncontrolled 
by any standard or rule prescribed by legislative action-to prevent the trustee 
from using its land for the proposed home. The superintendent is bound by the 
decision or inaction of such owners. There is no provision for review under the 
ordinance; their failure to give consent is final. They are not bound by any official 
duty, but are free to withhold consent for selfish reasons or arbitrarily and may 
subject the trustee to their will or caprice. 
!d. at 121-22. The idea that a few individuals could exercise prohibitory powers as part 
of a public law regulatory scheme particularly concerned the Roberge Court. Such an un-
constrained private use of police power was found to be "repugnant to the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.'' /d. at 122. In Eastlake, Justice Brown never con-
sidered whether an exclusionary land use decision arrived at by a referendum vote of 
the entire community also would be "repugnant" to his conception of landowners' due 
process rights. 
125. Undoubtedly, this feature of the case made the Seattle consent provision even 
more obnoxious to the Court. The landowner, a charitable organization, planned to replace 
an existing home for the elderly poor with a new building accommodating thirty residents; 
the proposed structure would be situated 110 to 400 feet from bordering land. !d. at 117. 
The zoning ordinance was amended in 1925 to contain an enhanced consent requirement, 
applying only to a "philanthropic home for children or old people," that demanded the 
approval of two-thirds of the neighbors within 400 feet of the site. !d. at 120 n. •. The 
original zoning ordinance allowed approval of such diverse uses as fraternity, sorority 
or boarding houses for students, private schools, community club houses and "a building 
necessary for the proper operation of a public utility'' to be within the discretion of the 
Board of Public Works after a public hearing. !d. Clearly, these land uses appear as disrup-
tive to the character of a neighborhood as a philanthropic home, yet they need only ob-
tain the approval of a municipal administrative agency. It was this apparent bias against 
the petitioner's proposed home that may have piqued the Court. It seems that the socially 
favored character of the home also allowed the Court to distinguish its decision from that 
in Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago, 242 U.S. 526 (1917), in which a neighbor's consent 
provision was upheld as applied to the location of billboards. The home in Roberge did 
not parallel the urban billboard, considered to be "by reason of [its] nature ... offen-
sive." 278 U.S. at 122. 
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Eastlake circumstances parallel those in Roberge in terms of exclu-
sionary effect but not method. 126 
Justice Brown perceived that a system of mandatory referenda 
for all land use changes was an unwarranted extension of the familiar 
plebiscite under federal constitutional doctrine. He accepted the use 
of the referendum device for large scale, community-wide decisions 
but rejected it for more specific determinations affecting separate 
parcels of land. 127 Because the opinion did not frame this position 
in terms of particular elements of unfairness experienced by in-
dividual landowners, the court's federal due process holding was 
nothing but an unsupported conclusion. In retrospect, a fully 
developed rationale might have been considerably more _persuasive 
to the Supreme Court upon review. 
The state supreme court's holding can be best interpreted as a 
judicial reaction to the danger of arbitrary action by a majority of 
voting citizens in a community. The state court's opinion expressed 
the idea that traditional, local government legislative policy choice 
was superior to similar action taken by citizen referendum on an 
ad hoc basis. Unfortunately, the court never explained fully why 
zoning plebiscite votes were inherently more suspect than similar 
decisions made by the customary, representative method. The 
essence of the court's view was that an individual landowner would 
be subjected to an extraordinary approval requirement over which 
neither the owner nor the courts could exercise much control. This 
factor, as much as the additional uncertainty imposed upon land-
owners seeking zoning changes, explains the court's hostility to the 
referendum zoning device as an abstract proposition. 
However, the Supreme Court of Ohio's decision in Eastlake re-
vealed another, more sinister ground for rejecting the referendum 
zoning technique, its potential for exclusionary zoning. In his con-
currence, Justice Stern viewed referendum zoning as a mtinicipal 
practice adopted for the sole purpose of obstructing attempts to pro-
126. Justice Stem, in his concurring opinion in Eastlake, characterized referendum zoning 
as an undesirable technique purposefully adopted "to obstruct change in land use" and 
more specifically intended "to prevent multi-family housing." 41 Ohio St. 2d at 199, 
324 N.E.2d at 748 (Stern,]., concurring). In terms of judicial review, the Ohio courts 
could have considered only legal challenges to the adequacy of the referendum procedure 
under state law and the reasonableness of the zoning classification. 
127. In his dissent to the Supreme Court's Eastlake opinion,-Justice Stevens adopted 
the same position. He noted that, "I have no doubt about the validity of the initiative 
or the referendum as an appropriate method of deciding questions of community policy. 
I think it is equally clear that the popular vote is not an acceptable method of adjudicating 
the rights of individual litigants." 426 U.S. at 693 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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vide multifamily housing within the locality. 128 Instead of embrac-
ing james v. Valtierra's positive characterization of land use referenda, 
Justice Stern interpreted the Eastlake charter provision to foster 
economic and racial exclusion from suburban communities. 129 Im-
plicit in his theory is the understanding that the mandatory 
referendum requirement could be used by existing community 
residents to preserve high cost, low density housing within the 
municipality. Proposals for less costly residential development to 
be occupied by persons of other racial or economic groups could 
be rebuffed by the voters wishing to protect their homogeneous com-
munity. Justice Stern's opinion demonstrated a fear that zoning prac-
tices could become more discriminatory and, ironically, more legally 
defensible if the referendum device were given judicial sanction. 130 
In an effort to forestall that result, the Ohio court pronounced the 
municipal technique of referendum zoning to be unconstitutional 
under the fourteenth amendment. 
128. Justice Stern explicitly concluded that "[z]oning provisions such as that in Eastlake's 
charter have a simple motive, and that is to exclude, to build walls against the ills, poverty, 
racial strife, and the people themselves, of our urban areas." 41 Ohio St. 2d at 200, 324 
N.E.2d at 749 (Stern, J., concurring). 
129. /d. at 199-201, 324 N.E.2d at 748-49 (Stern, J., concurring). An amicus brief 
filed by Lawyers for Housing had argued that such a provision was designed with an 
exclusionary intent. /d. at 198 n.4, 324 N.E.2d at 747 n.4. 
130. Justice Stern's fears became reality five years later in another Ohio case. See United 
States v. City of Parma, 494 F. Supp. 1049 (N.D. Ohio 1980), modified, 661 F. 2d 562 
(6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 926 (1982). In City of Parma, the municipality was 
sued by the United States for violating §§ 804(a) and 817 of the Fair Housing Act (42 
U.S.C. §§ 3604(a) & 3617 (1976)). !d. at 1055. The Justice Department successfully 
demonstrated that Parma voters had adopted a community policy of racial and economic 
exclusion by enacting a city ordinance that required prior referendum approval of""(1) 
the development, construction or acquisition in any manner of a subsidized housing pro-
ject by a public body, or (2) any participation by private individuals or non-public bodies 
in any program in which the Federal Government pays all or part of the rent of low-
income families." /d. at 1086 (citing Parma, Ohio, General Bldg. Regs. § 1528 (Nov. 
2, 1971)). This initiative ordinance bore a striking similarity to the California constitu-
tional provision upheld by the Supreme Court six-and-one-half months earlier in James 
v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 139 n.2 (1971) (quoting CAL. CoNsT. art. XXXIV, § 1). 
The Parma electorate later passed another initiative ordinance requiring "voter approval 
for any change in the zoning code or in existing land uses." 494 F. Supp. at 1089 (citing 
Parma, Ohio, Bldg. Code§ 1229.01 (Nov. 5, 1974)). In an extensive opinion, Chief Judge 
Battisti held that these two ordinances formed part of a pattern and practice of racial 
discrimination that violated the Fair Housing Act. /d. at 1096. In his subsequent remedial 
order, Judge Battisti totally invalidated the 1971 ordinance and modified the 1974 legisla-
tion by precluding its application to "any proposed change in land use where any low 
or moderate income housing project is proposed." United States v. City of Parma, 504 
F. Supp. 913, 920 (N.D. Ohio 1980), modified, 661 F.2d 562 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 
456 U.S. 926 (1982). Thus, City of Parma illustrates that an otherwise constitutionally 
acceptable referendum zoning ordinance may be thwarted if found to serve racially exclu-
sionary purposes violative of federal antidiscrimination statutes. · 
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2. Supreme Court Consideration 
By a six-three vote, the Supreme Court of the .United States re-
versed the state court's holding and upheld the referendum zoning 
technique against federal constitutional challenge. 131 In reaching this 
result, the majority embraced a theoretically coherent, yet surpris-
ingly short-sighted view of the impact of the referendum zoning 
device upon landowners and upon the public land use control system. 
The decision clearly rejected the reasoning of the Ohio supreme 
court'. 132 
The Court approached the issue of referendum zoning as a ques-
tion of classification: was the referendum device a reservation or 
a delegation of legislative power? Chief Justice Burger, writing for 
the majority, found that the Ohio court had mischaracterized the 
referendum as a delegation oflawmaking authority without any stan-
dards or guidelines within which to confine the nearly unbridled 
discretion of the voters. 133 He noted that " [a] referendum cannot 
... be characterized as a delegation of power ... [because] all power 
derives from the people .... [T]he people can reserve to themselves 
power to deal directly with matters which might otherwise be assigned 
to the legislature." 134 As a matter of technical analysis this conclu-
sion was correct; in the state constitution, Ohioans had reserved 
to themselves the power to legislate directly by way of the referen-
dum and initiative. 135 However, by focusing upon the Eastlake 
referendum provision as an example of reserved legislative power, 
Chief Justice Burger preordained the result in this case by way of 
a simple syllogism: if the referendum is but a method of direct legisla-
tion generally reserved to the people and if rezoning matters are 
categorized as local legislative acts, then rezoning by referendum 
is exempt from procedural due process attacks in much the same 
way as are other legislative decisions. 136 With this starting point, 
131. City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enter., 426 U.S. 668, 669, 679-80 (1976). 
132. /d. at 679. 
133. /d. at 672. 
134. /d. The Court stressed the referendum's role in and implied its desirability as 
part of the democratic process. See id. at 673,678-79 (citing Valtierra, 402 U.S. at 141, 143). 
135. The Ohio constitution provides in part: "The initiative and referendum powers 
are hereby reserved to the people of each municipality on all questions which such 
municipalities may now or hereafter be authorized by law to control by legislative action; 
such powers shall bt; exercised in the manner now or hereafter provided by law.'' OHIO 
CaNST. art. II, § lf. 
136. See generally Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445 
(1915) (general legislation valid even if every affected individual is not accorded due pro-
cess rights of notice and opportunity to be heard); Londoner v. City of Denver, 210 U.S. 
373 (1908) (same). Even in Londoner, however, the Court acknowledged that a state tax 
410 CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53 
the Court effectively insulated the referendum zoning procedure from 
constitutional challenges based upon the unfairness of the decision-
making process. 
Once cloaked with the "legislative act" characterization, the 
referendum zoning technique easily could withstand attack as an 
improper or standardless delegation oflegislative power. Under this 
rationale, the Eastlake voters were exercising direct control over mat-
ters within the broad area of zoning legislation. Consequently, any 
analogy to the improper delegation of power to administrative agen-
cies was irrelevant. 137 While this conclusion followed logically from 
the legislative classification, it ignored the basic principle addressed 
by the Supreme Court of Ohio-that fundamental local policy choices 
be made ''by a responsible organ of government'' in a non-arbitrary 
fashion. 138 Unlike its Ohio counterpart, the Supreme Court was not 
disturbed about the lack of fair procedure inherent in referendum 
zoning. By declining to impose due process limits on the practice 
of rezoning by public vote, the Court was willing to limit the federal 
interest to questions surrounding the substantive effect of the zon-
ing decision. 139 With the legislative classification neatly made, the 
scope of federal constitutional review would be limited to matters 
of irrational application 140 or confiscatory effect. 141 
In the name of participatory democracy, Chief justice Burger per-
mitted localities to rezone land by way of procedures not specifical-
statute, administered by a local board of equalization, works an unconstitutional denial 
of due process when it taxes local property without opportunity for redress. /d. at 385·86. 
And in Bi-Metallic, imposition of a particularly onerous burden upon a limited number 
of landowners militated in favor of finding a federal violation. See 239 U.S. at 446.· Might 
not such an analogy have been important to the Eastlake court? 
137. See 426 U.S. at 675. 
138. See Forest City Enter. v. City of Eastlake, 41 Ohio St. 2d 187, 196,324 N.E.2d 
740, 746 (1975), rev'd, 426 U.S. 668 (1976). 
139. See 426 U.S. at 676. Chief Justice Burger was not convinced that the local legislative 
body would follow predetermined standards for decision any more than the voting citizenry. 
/d. at 675 n.10. Because of his lack of confidence in the representative decisional process, 
the Chief Justice apparently surmised that referendum actions were at least as worthy 
of support as legislative actions. He concluded that "the critical constitutional inquiry, 
rather, is whether the zoning restriction produces arbitrary or capricious results." /d. at 
676 n.10. In this instance Chief Justice Burger appeared to blur his understanding of 
legislative motivation with a reasonably specific statement describing the elements required 
for procedural fairness. 
140. See id. at 676-77 (distinguishing Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 
365 (1926)); Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188-89 (1928) (zoning decision 
violates fourteenth amendment when not related to public health and welfare). See generally 
8 E. McQuiLLIN, THE LAw OF MuNICIPAL CoRPORATIONS § 25.43 (3d ed. 1983). This 
position avoids the essential question presented by the Eastlake case-whether there is a 
fundamental constitutional right to a fair procedure in a rezoning case. 
141. See Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
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ly authorized by state land use law. By granting the electorate the 
ultimate power to grant or deny rezoning actions, the Court nearly 
obliterated the landowners' preexisting rights to the traditional rezon-
ing process. 142 Eastlake's system measures, in a rough way, general 
community support for a change in land use regulations. Yet the 
holding in Eastlake permitted the use of the referendum zoning system 
for all rezoning determinations, whether or not of community-wide 
interest. Chief Justice Burger uniformly applied the legislative 
characterization to both of these factual situations; he failed to ex-
plain adequately why the justifiable rules regarding community-wide 
legislation ought to apply with equal force to rezoning requests of 
a limited geographical, social or economic impact. 143 
As a practical matter, perhaps the Court declined to distinguish 
between these two categories of rezonings in an effort to conserve 
judicial resources. But this motivation would not justify the posi-
tion taken. The application of the referendum requirement to "spot" 
rezonings144 denies the landowner the right to a fair procedure in 
which there is a "decisionmaker [who is] impartial and qualified 
to understand and to apply the controlling rules.'' 145 In these cases, 
the adverse impact of the referendum rezoning technique is focus-
ed particularly upon the individuals seeking the zoning change and 
is imposed with little recourse for judicial review. Further, the 
Court's holding in Eastlake operates to insulate only those zoning 
actions classified as legislative from the demands of procedural due 
process analysis. By comparison, other forms of relief from _land 
use regulations, such as variances, special exceptions and special 
use permits, would have been considered administrative or ad-
judicative acts, and therefore subject to minimal elements of pro-
cedural rights. 146 It is difficult to justify the Court's unsupported 
distinction. 
The Eastlake referendum approval system also affected the local 
community planning methodology. Under the charter, the referral 
mechanism was constructed so that essentially changes only to the 
142. See 426 U.S. at 682-83 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See generally 8 E. McQUILLIN, 
supra note 140, § 25.65. 
143. Chief justice Burger apparently believed, as did justice Stevens, that such a deci-
sion should be left to the state courts. See 426 U.S. at 683-84 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
144. For a discussion of "spot" zoning, see D. MANDELKER, LAND UsE LAw§ 6.23 
( 1982). 
145. 426 U.S. at 693 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
146. The Supreme Court of California's ruling in Topanga Ass'njor a Scenic Community 
v. County of Los Angeles exemplifies the high level of administrative factfinding and pro-
cedure needed to justify the issuance of a zoning variance. 11 Cal. 3d 506, 113 Cal. Rptr. 
836,522 P.2d 12 (1974) (en bane). 
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existing zoning scheme had to be ratified by the voters. 147 In prac-
tical terms, this extraordinary approval mechanism froze the pre-
sent land use control system. The Court did not view municipal 
planning and zoning as a gradually evolving process requiring 
periodic legislative reexamination and change. The present zoning 
configuration in a jurisdiction with a referendum zoning require-
ment effectively is preserved by the fact that a rezoning ordinance 
cannot be successful unless it survives both city council and voter 
approval. In creating such a two-tiered system, the ultimate respon-
sibility attached to rezoning decisions has been diffused and decen-
tralized. Indirectly this reduces the influence of professional city plan-
ners in the municipal land use regulatory system because all zoning 
changes would require voter ratification. A city planning director's 
recommendation, even if fully accepted by the city council, might 
not be approved by the electorate. 
Elimination of the representative feature of local government 
legislative decisionmaking, rather than constituting an admirable 
return to participatory democracy, changes the essence of land use 
determinations. Ironically, the Supreme Court's broad approval of 
the referendum zoning technique silences the articulate presenta-
tion of views on matters of public interest and removes the need 
for a decisionmaking body to defend coherently the positions taken. 
III. ZONING REFERENDA AND INITIATIVES 
IN THE STATE CouRTS 
Eastlake represents the sole instance in which the Supreme Court 
o( the United States considered the constitutionality of municipal 
systems combining zoning and referendum approval; as noted above, 
subjecting land use decisions to the direct control of the electorate 
was found not to violate the due process clause of the fourteenth 
amendment. The court's narrow holding presented a simplified view 
of the referendum zoning techniques and a limited application of 
constitutional due process principles. It hardly reflects the variety 
of issues and analyses found in state court opinions considering 
referendum and initiative land use decisionmaking. This section of 
the Article examines the analytical approaches taken by the state 
courts in this type of litigation with special emphasis given to those 
decisions rendered since Eastlake. Through this analysis, it will 
become clear that the Eastlake holding has not served as a great im-
147. 426 U.S. at 670 n.1 (quoting EASTLAKE, OHio, CHARTER art. VIII, § 3 (Nov. 2, 
1971)). 
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petus for the adoption of referendum zoning; in fact, state law has 
been substantially more influential. 
Referendum zoning matters have been a frequently litigated local 
government law subject in many states. Although the Supreme Court 
first considered referendum zoning in 1976, state courts have decided 
cases involving this phenomenon since the inception of zoning as 
a municipal regulatory technique. 148 State courts often are presented 
with a choice of competing public values: a fundamental respect 
for direct popular decisionmaking through electoral devices versus 
the desire to preserve the existing, judicially enforceable planning 
and zoning regulatory system. Despite Eastlake's sweeping encourage-
ment of land use control by direct voter participation, the courts 
in several states have limited the scope of referendum zoning and 
preserved the existing system of planning. State court judges 
apparently have realized that upholding a system of land use decision-
making by plebiscite greatly limits judicial supervision of the con-
ventional process by which significant community development ques-
tions are answered and private wealth transfers are made. State 
judges wisely note that with a referendum zoning approval 
mechanism superimposed on the traditional zoning procedure, novel 
problems arise concerning the timing of judicial review, procedural 
compliance with statutory referendum requirements, and the power 
to order the remedy of rezoning. 
For the most part, state courts have employed two major legal 
theories in approaching these cases. The first category places primary 
focus upon the precise nature of the local government's land use 
decision. The court determines whether, as a matter of state law, 
the particular type of zoning action was eligible for decision by direct 
popular vote; eligibility typically exists if the local land use decision 
can be classified a "legislative" one. 149 For a number of reasons, 
148. See, e.g., Hurst v. City of Burlingame, 207 Cal. 134, 277 P. 308 (1929), overruled, 
Associated Home Builders v. City of Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d 582, 596, 557 P.2d 473, 
480, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41, 48 (1976); see also Dwyer v. City Council, 200 Cal. 505, 253 
P. 932 (1927). 
149. See, e.g., Wait v. City of Scottsdale, 127 Ariz. 107, 108, 618 P .2d 601, 602 (1980); 
Arne! Dev. Co. v. City of Costa Mesa, 28 Cal. 3d 511, 516, 620 P.2d 565, 569, 169 
Cal. Rptr. 904, 908 (1980) (en bane); Margolis v. District Court, 638 P.2d 297, 303-04 
(Colo. 1981) (en bane); O'Meara v. City of Norwich, 167 Conn. 579, 583, 356 A.2d 
906, 908-09 (1975); Florida Land Co. v. City of Winter Springs, 427 So. 2d 170, 174 
(Fla. 1983); City of Coral Gables v. Carmichael, 256 So. 2d 404, 408 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1972); Chynoweth v. City of Hancock, 107 Mich. App. 360, 362, 309 N.W.2d 
606, 607 (1981); Denney v. City of Duluth, 295 Minn. 22, 29, 202 N.W.2d 892, 896 
(1972); Hilltop Realty, Inc. v. City of S. Euclid, 110 Ohio App. 535, 537-39, 164 N .E.2d 
180, 182-83, appeal dismissed, 170 Ohio St. 585, 166 N.E.2d 924 (1960). 
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only legislative matters may be exposed to plebiscite control. 15° Con-
sequently, actions that are characterized as "administrative" or 
"quasi-judicial" cannot be made properly subject to referendum 
approval. 151 If a non-legislative matter has undergone the referen-
dum process, its result must be invalidated. Once classified as a 
legislative act, a local government decision acquires immunity from 
most procedural due process attacks. 152 
A second group of decisions examines the relationship between 
the statutory procedures for zoning activities and those permitted 
when land use decisions are made by referendum or initiative; courts 
consider what, if any, conflict exists between the specific procedural 
requisites of state zoning legislation and the general requirements 
of direct electoral decisionmaking. 153 In these decisions, the elements 
of a referendum and initiative procedure have been subordinated 
to the particular notice and hearing requirements of the state's zoning 
enabling statute. Although courts have used several rationales in 
reaching this result, the effect has been to nullify decisions generated 
by the referendum method for failure to give the affected landowner 
sufficient pre-enactment rights to notice and public hearing. 154 Other 
150. Often this is true because of the dictates of state constitutional provisions or statutes. 
See supra note 135 and accompanying text. The legislative/administrative distinction, 
although long recognized, has been difficult to apply. See Fordham & Prendergast, The 
Initiative and Referendum at the Municipal Level in Ohio, 20 U. CIN. L. REv. 313, 320 (1951); 
see also 5 E. McQUILLIN, THE LAw OF MuNICIPAL CoRPORATIONS§ 16.55 (3d ed. 1981). 
As a practical matter, subjecting zoning administrative decisions to popular approval could 
interfere unduly with necessary and routine workings of local government. See Kelley v. 
John, 162 Neb. 319, 323-24, 75 N.W.2d 713, 716 (1956), overruled, 210 Neb. 504, 507, 
315 N.W.2d 628, 630 (1982). It is not clear why this rationale also should not preclude 
referendum consideration of minor rezonings having a minimal effect on the community. 
151. See West v. City of Portage, 392 Mich. 458, 467-68, 221 N.W.2d 303, 307-08 
(1974); Kelley v. John, 162 Neb. 319, 324, 75 N.W.2d 713, 716 (1956), overruled, 210 
Neb. 504, 507, 315 N.W.2d 628, 630 (1982); Forman v. Eagle Thrifty Drugs & Mkts., 
Inc., 89 Nev. 533, 537, 516 P.2d 1234, 1236 (1973); Bird v. Sorenson, 16 Utah 2d 1, 
2, 394 P.2d 808, 808 (1964); Leonard v. City of Bothell, 87 Wash. 2d 847, 849-50, 557 
P.2d 1306, 1308-09 (1976) (en bane); see also Snyder v. City of Lakewood, 189 Colo. 
421, 542 P.2d 371 (1975). 
152. Recent decisions have carried forward the logic of the Supreme Court's decision 
in Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915), holding 
that the public deserves no specific procedural due process in the development of legisla-
tion. See Coufv. DeBlaker, 652 F.2d 585, 590 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 921 
(1982). 
153. See, e.g., City of Scottsdale v. Superior Court, 103 Ariz. 204, 207-08, 439 P.2d 
290, 293-94 (1968) (en bane); Hurst v. City of Burlingame, 207 Cal. 134, 140-41, 277 
P. 308, 311-12 (1929) (en bane), overruled, 18 Cal. 3d 582, 557 P.2d 473, 135 Cal. Rptr. 
41 (1976); San Pedro North, Ltd. v. City of San Antonio, 562 S.W.2d 260, 262 (Tex. 
Civ. App.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1004 (1978). 
154. But see Associated Home Builders v. City of Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d 582, 596, 557 
P.2d 473, 480, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41, 48 (1976) (en bane) (notice and hearing requirements 
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courts have found referendum zoning impermissible because the 
authority to zone land had been granted exclusively from the state 
legislature to local government bodies. 155 
Since Eastlake, it is clear, however, that state courts have not been 
discouraged from approving referendum zoning practices. Surpris-
ingly, the Eastlake opinion has not served as a major theoretical sup-
port for the holdings in these cases. In general, the post-Eastlake 
decisions have followed the same two-prdnged analytical structure 
as had the cases decided prior to 1976. 
A. Jurisdictions Favoring Zoning Riferenda 
The most well-developed line of decisions supporting land use 
decisionmaking has come from the Supreme Court of California. 156 
In San Diego Building Contractors Association v. City Council, that court 
considered two fundamental questions: whether San Diego's city 
charter precluded the use of the initiative for zoning matters and 
whether the fourteenth amendment required notice and hearing 
before enactment of zoning legislation. 157 San Diego voters had 
adopted, by initiative, a thirty-foot height limitation ordinance 
applying to all buildings constructed within a specifically defined 
of California zoning statute inapplicable to instances of zoning by initiative); see also Fried-
man v. City of Fairfax, 81 Cal. App. 3d 667, 672 n.5, 146 Cal. Rptr. 687, 690 n.5 (1978) 
(same). 
155. See, e.g., City of Scottsdale v. Superior Court, 103 Ariz. 204, 207-08, 439 P.2d 
290, 293-94 (1968) (en bane); Hancock v. Rouse, 437 S.W.2d 1, 4 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969); 
San Pedro North, Ltd. v. City of San Antonio, 562 S.W.2d 260, 262 (Tex. Civ. App.), 
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1004 (1978). 
156. See, e.g., Arne! Dev. Co. v. City of Costa Mesa, 28 Cal. 3d 511, 620 P.2d 565, 
169 Cal. Rptr. 904 (1980) (en bane); Associated Home Builders v. City of Livermore, 
18 Cal. 3d 582, 557 P.2d 473, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1976); San Diego Bldg. Contractors 
Ass'n v. City Council, 13 Cal. 3d 205, 529 P.2d 570, 118 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1974) (en 
bane), appeal dismissed, 427 U.S. 901 (1976); Friedman v. City of Fairfax, 81 Cal. App. 
3d 667, 146 Cal. Rptr. 687 (1978); see also Friends of Mt. Diablo v. County of Contra 
Costa, 72 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 139 Cal. Rptr. 469 (1977). Of all of the states surveyed, 
California has the largest volume of reported case law involving land use control by 
plebiscite. 
All of the reported California litigation concerns judicial review of voluntary citizen 
initiatives; apparently the mandatory referendum system employed in Eastlake has never 
confronted the California courts. It seems unlikely, however, that zoning by referendum 
would receive different treatment than has land use control by citizen initiative. In fact, 
one of the earliest reported California high court opinions concerning plebiscites and land 
use control upheld a zoning referendum in Berkeley. See Dwyer v. City Council, 200 Cal. 
505, 519, 253 P. 932, 938 (1927); see also Johnston v. City of Claremont, 49 Cal. 2d 826, 
834, 323 P.2d 71, 75 (1958) (en bane). 
157. 13 Cal. 3d 205, 529 P.2d 570, 118 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1974) (en bane), appeal dis-
missed, 427 U.S. 901 (1976). 
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coastal zone area. 158 With respect to the first issue, Justice Tobriner 
found that all legislative matters, including zoning, were encom-
passed within the general initiative power reserved by the San Diego 
Charter. 159 
The court devoted most of its effort, however, to the second ques-
tion, specifically the allegation that adoption of local land use con-
trol ordinances by initiative procedure violated the due process clause 
of the fourteenth amendment. The plaintiff claimed that local govern-
ment acts affecting private property interests must be preceded by 
notice and hearing procedural elements to pass muster under federal 
constitutional theory .160 J u~tice Tobriner respnded with the prop-
osition that the same notice and hearing procedures constitutionally 
required to insure fairness in adjudicative or administrative deci-
sions were not necessary to support government acts categorized 
as legislative. 161 Adhering to this distinction and characterizing the 
height limitation as ''unquestionably a legislative act,'' the Califor-
nia court refused to invalidate the San Diego initiative ordinance. 162 
San Diego's significance is fourfold. First, it demonstrates the con-
stitutional importance of the administrative/legislative dichotomy 
and the differing rights associated with each classification, 163 a distinc-
158. ld. at 208 & n.1, 529 P.2d at 571 & n.1, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 147 & n.1. 
159. ld. at 209, 529 P.2d at 572, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 148. 
160. ld. at 211, 529 P.2d at 573, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 149. 
161. ld. at 212, 529 P.2d at 573-74, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 149-50 (relying on Mullane 
v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950)). Justice Tobriner quoted 
extensively from Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445 
(1915) (general democratic political control rather than due process theory properly limits 
excesses of American government). 
162. 13 Cal. 3d at 212, 218, 529 P.2d at 574, 578, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 150, 154. The 
court also rebuffed the plaintiff's argument that zoning legislation should be exempted 
from the general "no due process" constitutional position because land use control has 
a "substantial impact on real property values." ld. at 212, 529 P.2d at 574, 118 Cal. 
Rptr. at 150. Justice Tobriner correctly concluded that zoning ordinances were not the 
only form of legislation that adversely could affect private property. !d. at 213, 529 P. 2d 
at 574.-75, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 150-51. 
163. See id. at 211, 529 P. 2d at 5 73, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 149. In subsequent cases, the 
California courts have employed the adjudicative or administrative label to various local 
government actions to make them ineligible for decision by plebiscite. In Friends of Mount 
Diablo v. County of Contra Costa, the California court of appeals decided that a county board 
of superviso~s resolution approving reorganization of a planned unit district was an 
administrative, as opposed to a legislative, act and thus was outside the scope of the citizens' 
referendum power. 72 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 1008, 139 Cal. Rptr. 469, 470 (1977). County 
approval of the reorganization involved "a matter of [such] statewide concern ... as 
to convert the local legislative body into an administrative agent of the state." !d. at 1010, 
139 Cal. Rptr. at 471 (quoting Associated Home Builders v. City of Livermore, 18 Cal. 
3d 582, 596 n.14, 557 P.2d 473, 480 n.14, 135 Cal. Rptr. 40, 48 n.14). In Horn v. County 
of Ventura, the Supreme Court·of California ruled that a county's approval of a tentative 
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tion material to the Supreme Court of the United States in the 
Eastlake case. 164 Second, the decision reflects the California court's 
willingness to distinguish between legislative and non-legislative 
zoning actions and to extend direct electoral control only to the 
former. By viewing zoning variances and conditional use permits 
as administrative acts, the court recognized that formal differences 
in regulatory action constitutes a valid basis for divergent procedural 
rights. 165 Third, San Diego exemplifies a state supreme court fully 
embracing the participatory democratic model for land use issues 
and beginning to break free from the inhibiting effects of existing 
state law precedent, 166 foreshadowing subsequent broad acceptance 
of the principle of initiative control of community development policy 
recognized in Associated Home Builders v. City of Livermore167 and Arne[ 
Development Co. v. City of Costa Mesa. 168 And fourth, Justice Tobriner's 
opinion earns mention for its failure to consider the plaintiff's 
challenge to the San Diego ordinance under any doctrine other than 
federal constitutional law .169 
In 1976, California precedent concerning land use control by 
plebiscite was extended significantly in Associated Home Builders v. 
City of LivermoreY0 The voters of Livermore, California considered 
an initiative ordinance that placed a moratorium upon the issuance 
of residential building permits until three public facilities perfor-
mance criteria-education, sewage disposal and water supply-had 
subdivision map was an "adjudicatory function" requiring reasonable notice and the 
opportunity to be heard. 24 Cal. 3d 605, 610, 618, 596 P.2d 1134, 1136, 1138, 156 Cal. 
Rptr. 718, 720, 724 (1979). Although this classification was not pronounced in a referen-
dum case, arguably it implies that such subdivision approvals may not be subjected to 
initiative or referendum treatment. 
164. See City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enter., 426 U.S. 668, 673-74 (1976). 
165. See 13 Cal. 3d at 211-13, 529 P.2d at 573-74, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 149-50. In his 
concurrence in Horn, Justice Newman noted that the modern legislative process often en-
tails the notice and hearing elements associated with administrative and adjudicative 
decisionmaking. He cautioned that, in drawing a clear line between legislative and ad-
ministrative decisions and subjecting only the latter to procedural due process requirements, 
"we should not encourage legislators and rulemakers who conceivably yearn for a more 
comfortable past-when often they did proceed [to enact legislation] without notice, without 
hearing, in protective secrecy." 24 Cal. 3d at 621, 596 P.2d at 1143, 156 Cal. Rptr. 
at 727 (Newman, J., concurring). 
166. The San Diego decision anticipates the <;lemise of the Hurst v. City of Burlingame 
precedent. See irifra notes 170-73 and accompanying text. 
167. 18 Cal. 3d 582, 557 P.2d 473, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1976). 
168. 28 Cal. 3d 511, 620 P.2d 565, 169 Cal. Rptr. 904 (1980). 
169. The Supreme Court of California has not considered whether state constitutional 
conceptions of due process might provide more extensive procedural rights to those per-
sons adversely affected by referendum and initiative zoning decisions. See supra note 119. 
170. 18 Cal. 3d 582, 557 P.2d 473, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1976). 
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been satisfied. 171 The factual setting of the Livermore case is typical 
oflocal government efforts during the 1970's to control the develop-
ment of suburban areas; Livermore's total prohibition of residen-
tial construction for an indefinite period, however, may be viewed 
as one of the more extreme growth management devices. Speaking 
through justice Tobriner, the court explicitly overruled a forty-seven-
year-old precedent that had precluded California cities from adopting 
zoning ordinances by initiative. 172 Beginning with the premise that 
the right to conduct a popular initiative is one that had been con-
stitutionally reserved, as opposed to legislatively delegated, to the 
citizenry, the court found that this fundamental political power need 
not be subordinated to the procedural dictates of the California zon-
ing legislation. 173 • 
The Livermore decision is strongly supportive of popular determina-
tion of community-wide land use policy. In fact, both the Livermore 
and the San Diego fact patterns present situations in which general 
issues of community development were decided by initiative vote. 
In this respect, then, the California experience with land use 
plebiscites has been limited to broad public issues that readily could 
be considered proper subjects for legislation; treatment of the site 
specific zoning matters addressed in the Eastlake case would be left 
until a later day. Livermore did not consider seriously the effect of 
the prohibitory initiative ordinance from the perspective of the 
regulated landowner. The court's major concern was with the 
substantive effect of the Livermore ordinance rather than with the 
procedural method of its adoption. 174 Like the Supreme Court in 
Eastlake, the California court approved the direct method of enacting 
local legislation in sweeping terms and with little consideration of 
the practical implications of the decision. 175 
Taken together, San Diego and Livermore approved a broader use 
of referenda for local land use decisions than did the Supreme Court 
in Eastlake. And the state supreme court's holding in Arne! Develop-
171. !d. at 588, 557 P .2d at 475, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 43. For specification of the stan· 
dards, see id. at 590-91 & n.2, 557 P.2d at 476 & n.2, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 44 & n.2. 
172. /d. at 596, 557 P.2d at 480, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 48 (overruling Hurst v. City of 
Burlingame, 207 Cal. 134, 277 P. 308 (1929)). 
173. /d. at 591, 596, 557 P.2d at 477, 480-81, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 45, 48-49. 
174. The court devoted most of its opinion to a discussion and subsequent rejection 
of the plaintiff's constitutional arguments of vagueness, the impact upon the right to travel 
and the breadth of the police power. /d. at 597-610, 557 P.2d at 481-89, 135 Cal. Rptr. 
at 49-57. 
175. Even though Livermore was issued after Eastlake, it did not discuss whether its holding 
would apply to zoning by referendum or initiative. 
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ment Co. v. City of Costa Mesa applied the expansive principles of the 
two prior cases to a zoning context. 176 Arne! involved a challenge 
to a rezoning initiative that had blocked construction of a fifty-acre 
single-family and apartment construction project. 177 Neighboring 
property owners organized and circulated an initiative petition that 
resulted in the rezoning of the subject parcel to an R -1 single fami-
ly residential one. 178 The court considered the issue of whether rezon-
ing by local initiative violates federal or state constitutional precepts 
when the land involved is a small parcel or has a limited number 
of owners. 179 With this question presented, the state supreme court 
was asked to repudiate a substantial number of prior opinions and 
to join the courts of several other states in viewing the limited-area 
rezoning as an administrative or adjudicative act; 180 the majority 
declined the invitation. 
·The Arne! court adhered to California's classification of zoning 
and rezoning as legislative acts and the proper subject of democratic 
decisionmaking. 181 It explicitly found that rezoning by initiative did 
not violate the due process clause of the federal Constitution. 182 One 
of the few state court opinions discussing the Eastlake case, the opin-
ion merely restates the positions taken by the Supreme Court con-
cerning the federal constitutional issue. 183 Justice Tobriner stated 
that the availability of administrative relief mechanisms plus the 
potential for judicial review of the substantive zoning classification 
were sufficient protection against any unfairness a zoning plebiscite 
might exact against a landowner. 184 As a matter of state constitu-
176. 28 Cal. 3d 511, 620 P.2d 565, 169 Cal. Rptr. 904 (1980). 
177. /d. at 513, 620 P. 2d at 566, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 905. The rezoning initiative in-
volved three contiguous parcels of land with a combined area of 68 acres. Arnel's parcel 
was 50 acres in size and had been rezoned in 1976 to accommodate 127 single-family 
residences and 539 apartment units. The city had approved Arnel's development plan 
and tentative tract map nearly a year prior to the passage of the rezoning initiative that 
blocked construction of the project. !d. at 515, 620 P.2d at 567, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 906. 
Apparently Arne! had not come within the scope of the vested rights doctrine to enable 
him to complete the project. See D. MANDELKER, supra note 144, §§ 6.11-.21; see, e.g., 
County ofKauai v. Pacific Standard Life Ins. Co., 653 P.2d 766 (Hawaii Sup. Ct. 1982), 
appeal dismissed, 103 S. Ct. 1762 ( 1983). 
178. 28 Cal. 3d at 515, 620 P.2d at 567, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 905. 
179. !d. at 516, 620 P.2d at 567-68, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 907. 
180. !d. at 522 n.10, 620 P.2d at 571 n.10, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 910 n.10 (citing West 
v. City of Portage, 392 Mich. 458,221 N.W.2d 303 (1974~; Fasano v. Board of County 
Comm'rs, 264 Or. 574, 507 P.2d 23 (1973); Leonard v. City of Bothell, 87 Wash. 2d 
847, 557 P.2d 1306 (1976)). 
181. !d. at 522, 620 P.2d at 571, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 910. 
182. !d. at 519-21, 620 P.2d at 570-71, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 909-10. 
183. !d., 620 P.2d at 570-71, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 909-10. 
184. /d. at 521, 620 P.2d at 571, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 910. 
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tional principle, Arnel reiterated San Diego's position. 185 The logic 
of Justice Tobriner's constitutional analysis turned entirely upon 
the legislative characterization of the initiative rezoning. Almost as 
an afterthought, the majority opinion justified its generic classifica-
tion of rezoning as an effort to assure interested parties concerning 
matters of procedural rights and the availability of judicial review 
for popularly adopted land regulation. 186 The court's automatic 
labelling system effectively removed the question of classification 
from the state's judiciary. 
In Arnel, the Supreme Court of California fully embraced the 
plebiscite as a legitimate method oflocalland use control, augment-
ing the Supreme Court's Eastlake view of direct democracy by 
foreclosing any state constitutional due process cause of action .. 
Perhaps the state's political tradition influenced the court's will-
ingness to recognize and to uphold direct democratic decisionmaking. 
The majority also genuinely may have believed that the owners af-
fected would be protected by preexisting legal doctrines applicable 
to all zoning decisions, 187 thus making state due process principles 
duplicative and unnecessary. Obviously, Arnel's broad approval has 
made California a leading jurisdiction supporting the referendum 
zoning principle, inviting others to follow its example. 188 
B. Jurisdictions Unfavorable 
to Zoning Referenda 
The Supreme Court of Washington has enunciated the most. 
extreme position rejecting zoning referenda. In Leonard v .. City of 
Bothell, the court affirmed a denial of a writ of mandamus that would 
have compelled city council to order a referendum election to con-
sider a recent rezoning ordinance. 189 Under the facts, the owner 
185. /d., 620 P.2d at 571, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 910 (citing San Diego :J3ldg. Contractors 
Ass'n v. City Council, 13 Cal. 3d 205, 529 P.2d 570, 118 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1974)). 
186. /d. at 523, 620 P.2d at 572, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 911. The certainty borne by such 
a system of automatic classification was believed to spare the state courts case-by-case 
decision as to whether a zoning initiative or referendum was a legislative or adjudicative 
act. /d., 620 P.2d at 572-73, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 912. 
18 7. See supra text accompanying notes 140-41. 
188. Jurisdictions other than California support the use of the referendum zoning tech-
nique. See, e.g., Margolis v. District Court, 638 P.2d 297 (Colo. 1981 ); Florida Land Co. 
v. City of Winter Springs, 427 So. 2d 170 (Fla. 1983); see also Ritchmount Partnership 
v. Board of Supervisors of Elections, 283 Md. 48, 388 A.2d 523 (1978); Anne Arundel 
County v. McDonough, 277 Md. 271, 354 A.2d 788 (1976). Ritchmount Partnership raises 
an issue that is discussed infrequently: what happens when a popular referendum rejects 
a rezoning ordinance? 
189. 87 Wash. 2d 847, 557 P.2d 1306 (1976) (en bane). 
1983] REFERENDUM ZONING 421 
of a one-hundred-and-forty-one-acre parcel-originally zoned for 
agricultural use-sought rezoning to build a regional shopping 
center. 190 Pursuant to state law, a comprehensive environmental im-
pact statement was prepared. The planning commission conducted 
thirteen public meetings and ten public hearings on the rezoning 
request; it later voted unanimously to rezone the area to allow the 
intended use. 191 Thereafter, city council considered the matter at 
twenty-four public meetings and two public hearings that had 
followed a city-wide advisory ballot approving the rezoning 
request. 192 Ultimately city council rezoned the property as requested, 
precipitating the plaintiff's request to seek a referendum election 
on the rezoning ordinance. 193 
The Leonard case was considered on appeal after it had become 
moot, reflecting the state supreme court's interest in the referen-
dum zoning issue. 194 The court commenced its analysis with the 
customary-and unexceptional-statement that referendum elections 
were limited to those acts of governmental bodies that are legislative 
in nature. 195 But application of this classification principle to the 
zoning and rezoning context produced an unusual result. The 
majority conceded that the initial adoption of the zoning code and 
a comprehensive zaning plan constituted a legislative policymaking 
act. 196 By comparison, however, amendments of a zoning ordinanee 
were characterized as mere implem.entations of the zoning code, pro-
perly considered part of the administrative function. 197 Thus, the 
Leonard court viewed rezonings. as adjudications that balance the 
rights of competitors in a quasi-judicial context. 198 Viewing the 
matter in this light, the majority found that "[t]he ordinance merely 
rezoned the property and modified the language of the plan to reflect 
the anticipated land-use change. We do not view the ordinance as 
190. /d. at 848, 557 P.2d at 1307. 
191. /d., 557 P.2d at 1307. 
192. /d., 557 P.2d at 1308. 
193. /d., 557 P.2d at 1308. 
194. Justice Hamilton noted that this case involved a matter of substantial public in-
terest and warranted treatment other than mere dismissal. /d. at 849, 557 P.2d at 1308. 
195. /d. at 849-50, 557 P.2d at 1308. 
196. /d. at 850, 557 P.2d at 1309 (citing Fleming v. City of Tacoma, 81 Wash. 2d 
292, 502 P.2d 327 (1972) (en bane)). 
197. /d., 557 P.2d at 1309. Such a stance broke no new ground for the Washington 
court given that three recent cases had adopted the same view. See Barrie v. Kitsap County, 
84 Wash. 2d 579, 586,527 P.2d 1377, 1381 (1974) (en bane); Fleming v. City of Tacoma, 
81 Wash. 2d 292, 299,502 P.2d 327, 331 (1972) (en bane); Buell v. City of Bremerton, 
80 Wash. 2d 518, 524, 495 P.2d 1358, 1362 (1972) (en bane). 
198. 87 Wash. 2d at 850-51, 557 P.2d at 1309. 
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a legislative policy-making decision, and thus it is not subject to 
a referendum election. " 199 Of course, this result ignored the fact 
that the developer intended to convert a one-hundred-and-forty-one-
acre parcel from low to extremely high intensity use. Even if small 
area rezonings might be considered the proper subject for adjudica-
tion, a rezoning of this magnitude would seem instead better suited 
for a broad, legislative policymaking decision. Apparently, the court 
wished to maintain a uniform position against subjecting rezoning 
decisions to referendum control. 200 
Leonard concluded its analysis with discussion of an element raised 
by Justice Stevens in his dissent to the Eastlake decision. 201 The 
Washington court emphasized that rezoning decisions ''require an 
informed and intelligent choice by individuals who possess the 
expertise to consider the total economic, social and physical 
characteristics of the community.' ' 202 Such reasoned decisionmaking 
obviously is absent from a system that demands only a "yes" or 
"no" decision on complex issues. And although the Leonard court 
did not require, as a matter of state constitutional principle, this 
kind of informed decisionmaking, it did voice its approval of the 
city's thorough analysis of the consequences of the rezoning pro-
posal. Undoubtedly, the Leonard holding represents a different view 
of a local government's land use control functions than do the other 
cases sustaining referendum zoning. 203 
IV. AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSis oF REFERENDUM ZoNING IN 
CuYAHOGA CouNTY, OHIO 
This section of the Article examines the referendum zoning techni-
ques used by municipalities within Cuyahoga County, Ohio between 
1962 and 1982. This area was selected because of its geographical 
size, varied population density and number of municipal govern-
ments. Within the county there are sixty local governments, each 
possessing either home rule or general law powers. As stated above, 
Ohio constitutional, statutory and case law encourages the use of 
199. !d. at 851, 557 P.2d at 1309. 
200. See id. at 851-52, 557 P.2d at 1309-10 (quoting Kelley v. John, 162 Neb. 319, 
75 N.W.2d 713 (1956), overruled, 210 Neb. 504, 315 N.W.2d 628 (1982)). 
201. See City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enter., 426 U.S. 668, 693 (1976) (Stevens, 
J., dissenting). 
202. 87 Wash. 2d at 854, 557 P.2d at 1311. 
203. Jurisdictions other than Washington disfavor the use of the referendum zoning 
technique. See, e.g., Gumprecht v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 104 Idaho 615, 661 P.2d 1214 
(1983); San Pedro North, Ltd. v. City of San Antonio, 562 S.W.2d 260 (Tex. Civ. App.), 
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1004 (1978). 
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plebiscites by permitting legislative matters to be initiated by citizen 
petition and to be reviewed by referendum. The variety of municipal 
ordinance or charter provisions that subject land use control deci-
sions to the vote of the electorate will be noted, as will patterns 
developed as a consequence of using the referendum zoning system. 
A. An Overview of Charter Provisions 
Empirical analysis began by a review of the municipal ordinances 
and charter provisions, with special attention paid to their treat-
ment of referendum and initiative matters. Because there is no cen-
tral registry of local legislation, direct inquiry was made of each 
municipal office and each law director. This survey revealed the 
pervasiveness of referendum zoning within Cuyahoga County. Man-
datory referendum requirements were found in nineteen of sixty 
municipalities. 204 Within these nineteen jurisdictions, local law re-
quired that a wide range of land use control decisions be subject 
to referendum approval prior to taking effect. Ordinances in a 
number of other communities simply stated that their citizens possess-
ed all of the rights with respect to initiatives and referenda as con-
ferred by state law. In these instances, the popular right to review 
locally enacted legislation or to originate new proposals becomes 
a voluntary matter dependent upon sufficient voter interest to sup-
port full electoral consideration. It also was apparent from the survey 
that the Eastlake decision had not caused the immediate adoption 
of referendum zoning legislation. In fact, a number of the jurisdic-
tions adopted their referendum schemes during the early 1970s, 
subsequent to the Supreme Court's opinion in James v. Valtierra. 205 
As a general proposition, there was no geographical, or size, pat-
tern to the distribution of the mandatory zoning referendum or-
dinances throughout the county. 
204. Within the county there were 19 municipalities that had referendum zoning pro-
visions in their charters or ordinances. Cities: (1) BAY VILLAGE, OHIO, CHARTER art. VII, 
§ 7 .6; (2) BRECKSVILLE, OHIO, CHARTER art. IV, § 12; (3) BROADVIEW HEIGHTS, OHIO, 
CHARTER art. IX; (4) FAIRVIEW PARK, OHIO, CHARTER art. IV, § 16; (5) GARFIELD HEIGHTS, 
OHIO, CHARTER § 58; (6) HIGHLAND HEIGHTS, OHIO, CHARTER art. VIII, § 8.02.02; (7) 
INDEPENDENCE, OHIO, CHARTER art. IV, §§ 5d-5e; (8) MIDDLEBURG HEIGHTS, Omo, 
CHARTER (no section given); (9) NoRTH OLMSTED, Omo, CHARTER art. VII, § 2e; (10) 
PARMA, Omo, ordinance issue 38; (11) PEPPER PIKE, Omo, CHARTER art. VIII,§ 1; (12) 
SEVEN HILLS, OHIO, CHARTER art. XIV; (13) SoLON, Omo, CHARTER art. XIV; (14) 
STRONGSVILLE, OHIO, CHARTER art. IV, § 6(h); (15) WESTLAKE, OHIO, CHARTER § 13. 
Villages: (16) CHAGRIN FALLS, OHIO, CHARTER art. X, § 4; (17) MAYFIELD, Omo, CHARTER 
art. III, § 14; (18) MoRELAND HILLS, OHIO, CHARTER art. VIII, § 2; and (19) ORANGE, 
Omo, CHARTER art. III, §§ 13-14. 
205. 402 u.s. 137 (1971). 
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The substance of the language appearing in charter and ordinance 
provisions demonstrates numerous approaches. First, as mentioned, 
many jurisdictions were found to have no legislation specifically deal-
ing with plebiscites; therefore, they implicitly recognize the rights 
conferred to citizens by the Ohio constitution and relevant statutes. 206 
Second, some localities merely acknowledged the state-granted rights 
to initiative and referendum in their local ordinances. 207 These pro-
visions were general in scope and did not focus on the application 
of referenda and initiatives to land use decisionmaking. Third, a 
number of municipalities subjected all zoning classification, district 
and use change ordinances to confirmation by mandatory 
referenda, 208 reminiscent of that construed in Eastlake. 209 However, 
some jurisdictions have modified this type of ordinance to require 
that all zoning changes, both legislative and administrative, undergo 
mandatory voter approval. 21° Fourth, five of the communities 
sampled had coupled a "ward veto" provision with their mandatory 
zoning referendum requirements, granting veto power over land 
206. See supra note 135. 
207. For example, the Lyndhurst, Ohio charter provides that "[o]rdinances and other 
measures may be proposed by initiative petition and adopted by election, and ordinances 
and other measures adopted by the Council shall be subject to referendum, to the extent 
and in the matter now or hereafter provided by the Constitution or the Laws of Ohio.'' 
LYNDHURST, OHio, CHARTER art. VIII, § 1. 
208. The Village of Chagrin Falls provides in its charter that: 
No ordinance which provides for a change in the existing municipal zoning map 
or which otherwise provides for a change in the use of property from the uses 
presently authorized by the existing zoning code shall become effective until referred 
to the Board of Elections of Cuyahoga County for submission to the electors and 
approved by a majority of the electors voting thereon at the next succeeding general 
election, in any year occurring subsequent to 90 days after the approval of such 
ordinance by the Mayor, or the overriding by Council of the disapproval whichever 
occurs later. 
CHAGRIN FALLS, OHIO, CHARTER art. X, § 4. 
209. See City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enter., 426 U.S. 668, 686 n.8 (1976) (Stevens, 
J., dissenting). 
210. The city charter of Solon, Ohio provides a good example of this: 
An ordinance, resolution, or other action, whether legislative or administrative 
in nature, effecting a change in the zoning classification or district of any prop-
erty within the City of Solon, Ohio, shall not become effective after the passage 
thereof, until Council submits such ordinance, resolution or other action to the 
electorate at a regularly scheduled election. 
SoLON, OHio, CHARTER art. XIV, § 1. 
Several other charter provisions seem to track this language rather closely. The exten-
sion to include administrative land use control modification plainly appears to be un-
authorized in light of the Supreme Court of Ohio's holding in Forest City Enter. v. City 
of Eastlake, 41 Ohio St. 2d 187,324 N.E.2d 740 (1975), rev'd, 426 U.S. 668 (1976). The 
Solon charter section was approved by the voters shortly after the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Eastlake. 
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use changes to the voters in the election.ward in which the subject 
land was located. 211 Because exercise of this veto vests ultimate 
legislative power in a narrow segment of the community, such a 
provision runs contrary to the direct holding of the Eastlake majori-
ty. Fifth, several localities limited their mandatory referendum re-
quirements to zoning changes that would facilitate the construction 
of multifamily housing construction designed to exceed a predeter-
mined height limitation, or when the number of multifamily units 
within the municipality exceeds a preset percentage of all dwellings 
in the town. 212 Such selective application of the referendum require-
ment to these multifamily residential land uses demonstrates the 
potential of referendum zoning as a not so subtle variant of exclu-
sionary zoning. 213 Although such a categorization probably would 
not violate fourteenth amendment due process and equal protec-
tion principles, it might be unlawful within the context of the Fair 
Housing Act. 214 Sixth, several localities specifically required that 
the applicant for the zoning change pay the costs associated with 
the conduct of the mandatory referendum, undoubtedly deterring 
all but the most solvent landowners from even seeking zoning 
changes. 215 
This survey indicates that the basic requirement to refer zoning 
211. The ward veto system vests a great deal of power in relatively few people. For 
example, in the Fairview Park, Ohio charter "an ordinance ... effecting a change in 
the uses permitted in any zoning use classification or district ... shall not become effec-
tive after the passage thereof, until Council submits such ordinance ... to the electorate 
at a regularly scheduled election, occurring more than sixty (60) days after the ordinance, 
resolution, or other action is approved by a majority of the electors voting thereon, in 
his Municipality and in each ward in which the change is applicable to property in the 
ward." See FAIRVIEW PARK, OHIO, CHARTER art. IV, § 16(b). In this jurisdiction, the 
referendum requirement and ward veto provision also apply to zoning legislation initiated 
by the voters. /d. § 16(c). 
212. Several of the mandatory referral ordinances were focused specifically on the per-
ceived problem of increasing multifamily residential units within the jurisdiction. For ex-
ample, those phrased in terms of percentage include: NoRTH OLMSTED, OHIO, CHARTER 
art. VII, § 2( e) (20% ); STRONGSVILLE, OHIO, CHARTER art. IV, § 6(h) (15% ). Mandatory 
referenda delimited by height provisions include: MAYFIELD, OHIO, CHARTER art. III, 
§ 12; ORANGE, OHIO, CHARTER art. III, § 14. A final category of provisions requires the 
referendum approval any time zoning or rezoning is designed to provide for multifamily 
dwellings; here, the nature of the proposed new use of land is all important. See IN-
DEPENDENCE, OHIO, CHARTER art. IV, § (d). 
213. See supra note 129 and accompanying text. 
214. See United States v. City of Parma, 494 F. Supp. 1049 (N.D. Ohio 1980), modified, 
661 F.2d 562 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S 926 (1982), discussed supra note 130. 
215. See, e.g., NoRTH OLMSTED, OHIO, CHARTER art. VII, § 2(e) ("[T]he applicant 
agrees to assume all costs of the special election (on the referendum zoning issue) including 
advertising, and further posts a bond with the Director of Finance of the City of North 
Olmsted."). 
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changes to the electorate for ratification or rejection has been 
embellished considerably by the ordinances of some localities. The 
embellishments observed in this Ohio county also reflect the quality 
of legal counsel available to these local governments; several of the 
features of these referendum zoning provisions either are of dubious 
validity or plainly are unlawful. Apparently, no attempts were made 
to revise local legislation to comport with the demands of federal 
or state supreme court judgments. Perhaps inadvertence explains 
local counsels' failure to recommend the reformation of ordinance 
and charter provisions, but inaction may represent a conscious at-
tempt to ignore the prevailing legal principles until a lawsuit is 
threatened. In any event, the survey no doubt reflects the reality 
that local governments do not embrace immediately the rulings of 
judicial authorities and that specific provisions of local law often 
lag behind the direct 'commands of the courts. Beyond this, the 
referendum zoning requirements studied reflect a general attitude 
favoring citizen control over changes in the nature of the local com-
munity. They reflect a lack of trust in the judgment of local elected 
officials and an implicit desire to reinforce existing land use patterns. 
B. Evaluation of Referendum 
Zoning Results 
The research project examined Cuyahoga County election records 
from 1962 to 1982 to determine how referenda and initiatives were 
used to make land use control decisions. The study sought data on 
a range of matters related to the subject of referendum zoning, the 
frequency of occurrence, the distribution of occurrence, the types 
of issues subjected to voter approval by plebiscite, and the rates of 
success and failure of land use subjects over time. 
As the table below indicates, 216 the total number of land use 
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referenda217 generally grew; the peak-an average of nearly eighteen 
per year-occurred from 197 7 through 1980. An increased adop-
tion of mandatory zoning provisions following the Supreme Court's 
decisions in Valtierra and Eastlake may explain the peak. 218 Over the 
entire duration of the research, however, the average frequency was 
far less; slightly greater than seven referenda per year. Oddly enough, 
during 1981 and the first half of 1982, no zoning matters were decided 
by public vote. Considering the size of Cuyahoga County and the 
number of local governments included in it, the data gathered 
describe a land use control technique remarkably underutilized. 
Attempted zoning changes by voter initiative were far less fre-
quent. Over the same study period, there were thirty-five initiatives 
compared to one hundred and fifty-two referenda. 219 This discre-
1970 7 3 42% 
1969 0 0 
1968 1 0 0% 
1967 2 0 0% 
1966 0 0 
1965 6 0 0% 
1964 4 0 0% 
1963 1 0 0% 
1962 5 4 80% 
152 93 61.2% 
217. The survey of county records indicated that a variety of land use control issues 
were placed on the ballot besides the automatic referral of rezoning and other regulatory 
relief requests. For instance, localities used the referendum technique to (1) change the 
definition of residential use as it pertained to home offices; (2) change procedural re-
quirements for zoning administration; (3) alter the composition of zoning boards; (4) 
eliminate washing of vehicles as a permitted use for automotive facilities; (5) adopt com-
prehensive planning documents; and (6) amend minimum side yard requirements. The 
vast majority of referenda, however, were held to determine whether a particular parcel 
of land should be rezoned to a different use classification. 
218. In the period following the Supreme Court's decision in Valtierra, the following 
12 municipalities adopted mandatory referendum zoning provisions: Bay Village (May 
7, 1974, general); Broadview Heights (Nov. 2, 1976, general); Fairview Park (Nov. 4, 
1975, general); Garfield Heights (Nov. 8, 1977, general); Highland Heights (Nov. 5, 1974, 
general); Independence (Nov. 8, 1977, general); North Royalton (May 2, 1972, multifamily 
only); Pepper Pike (May 7, 1974, general); Seven Hills (Nov. 2, 1976, general); Solon 
(Nov. 8, 1977, general); Strongsville (Nov. 4, 1980, multifamily only); and Westlake (Nov. 
6, 1973, multifamily only). It would seem that the Supreme Court's support for land use 
plebiscites influenced a large number of municipalities to adopt mandatory referral 
provisions. 
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pancy is understandable; initiatives require citizens to form an 
organization concerned with a particular issue and to collect a suf-
ficient number of signatures to have the question placed on the 
ballot. 220 Such an undertaking requires a level of personal commit-
ment to a land use issue that ordinarily can be mustered only in 
a limited number of instances. Initiatives, in addition to being less 
numerous than zoning referenda, fail to demonstrate the same in-
creasing pattern of frequency over the study period as did zoning 
referenda. The distribution of all land use control initiatives over 
the twenty-year period was relatively uniform, averaging slightly 
less than two per year. But during the 1962-1982 period, only four-
teen of these initiatives were for specific rezoning requests. Thus, 
rezoning by initiative has been used less frequently to. circumvent 
the traditional governmental zoning process. 
Undoubtedly the most important data derived were those con-
cerning the success or failure of matters presented for direct voter 
decision through the referendum or initiative mechanism. Over the 
study period, land use referenda were successful sixty-one percent 
of the time, while initiatives-at forty-eight percent-enjoyed a lower 
degree of success. If the analysis were limited to referenda and in-
itiatives concerned solely with single parcel rezonings, the success 
ratio drops to forty-eight percent and twenty-one percent 
respectively. 221 These results hardly reflect a picture of complete 
1979 1 0 0% 
1978 0 0 
1977 3 2 66% 
1976 2 2 100% 
1975 3 1 33% 
1974 6 1 16% 
1973 4 2 50% 
1972 1 0 0% 
1971 3 3 100% 
1970 1 0 0% 
1969 0 0 
1968 4 2 50% 
1967 1 1 100% 
1966 0 0 
1965 1 1 100% 
1964 2 0 0% 
1963 1 0 0% 
1962 0 0 
35 17 48% 
220. See 0. REYNOLDS, supra note 16, at 730. 
221 . Referenda Concerning the Rezoning of a Single Parcel of Land 
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citizen hostility to all zoning changes. But it must be remembered 
that most of the unsuccessful referendum proposals would have been 
Total Successful Success Rate 
1981 0 0 
1980 12 11 91% 
1979 14 13 93% 
1978 3 2 66% 
1977 6 4 66% 
1976 6 3 50% 
1975 3 0 0% 
1974 5 0 0% 
1973 4 2 50% 
1972 7 1 14% 
1971 1 1 100% 
1970 4 0 0% 
1969 0 0 
1968 0 0 
1967 2 0 0% 
1966 0 0 
1965 7 0 0% 
1964 3 0 0% 
1963 0 0 
1962 2 1 50% 
1961 0 0 
79 38 48.1% 
Initiatives Concerning the Rezoning of a Single Parcel of Land 
Total Successful Success Rate 
1981 0 0 
1980 1 1 10% 
1979 1 0 0% 
1978 0 0 
1977 1 0 0% 
1976 0 0 
1975 1 0 0% 
1974 3 0 0% 
1973 0 0 
1972 1 0 0% 
1971 0 0 
1970 1 0 0% 
1969 0 0 
1968 3 1 33% 
1967 1 1 100% 
1966 0 0 
1965 0 0 
1964 0 0 
1963 1 0 0% 
1962 0 0 
1961 0 0 
14 3 21% 
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enacted into local law absent the plebiscite requirement. As the tables 
presented reveal, 222 there has been great variation in the annual suc-
cess rates of the rezoning plebiscites. For instance, from 1961 through 
1970, only one referendum and two initiative proposals were ap-
proved out of a total of twenty-four conducted. Yet the time from· 
1971 through 1980 saw both an increased frequency and a higher 
success ratio for zoning referenda: thirty-seven of sixty-one rezoning 
proposals won approval. In contrast, rezoning by citizen initiative 
during this decade was markedly less successful: only one victory. 
The recent high success rate is puzzling given its tendency to refute 
claims that zoning referenda represent a sophisticated exclusionary 
land use technique. Moreover, it suggests that the mandatory referral 
system largely confirms decisions previously made by city councils 
on matters of land use policy. As such, it unnecessarily adds time 
delay and administrative and project costs to the process. In light 
of these conclusions, one must question whether the costs of the 
referendum zoning system imposed upon the municipality and the 
landowner are justified by the benefits accruing to the community. 
C. Observations Concerning Referendum Zoning in Cuyahoga County 
A number of conclusions follow from the results of the Cuyahoga 
County study. First, the automatic referral system adopted 
throughout the county was much more pervasive than was originally 
anticipated. Nearly one-third of all the municipalities within this 
county require some or all zoning changes to be ratified by positive 
vote of the electorate. Still, a number of zoning referenda identified 
by the research were conducted in jurisdictions that did not 
automatically refer zoning matters to the voters. Specific issues, 
therefore, were submitted for public approval simply because suffi-
cient numbers of citizens petitioned their local governments to call 
for a vote of the electorate. In context, however, the automatic refer-
ral and the voluntary referenda did not constitute a large number 
of zoning matters in the abstract. Considering the population count, 
geographic size and large number of political jurisdictions within 
the study area, it is somewhat surprising that there were so few re-
zonings actually referred to the citizens for approval. This observa-
tion possibly means that land developers both used their property 
in consonance with existing zoning classifications and sought infre-
quent deviations from existing regulations. A more likely explana-
tion posits that techniques probably were developed that" escaped 
222. See supra notes 216 and 219. 
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automatic referendum requirements contained in local charters or 
ordinances. For instance, use of an emergency declarati,on attached 
to a piece of municipal legislation effectively would shield a rezon-
ing matter from the requirement of referendum approval. This 
technique and others may have circumvented the technical requisites 
of the referendum zoning provisions of local law. 
Second, an interesting side issue emerges. The study reveals that 
the referendum requirement has been applied to land parcels of vary-
ing sizes. This means, of course, that the rezoning of a one-acre 
parcel from single-family to duplex use might require validation by 
referendum just as a seventy-eight-acre parcel would. Often the elec-
tion records did not reveal the exact size of the parcel beil).g con-
sidered; but when that information was provided, it was clear that 
zoning referenda were required for both small and large lots. 
Apparently size was not a determinative factor in presenting the 
land use issue before the electorate. 
Finally, no clear pattern regarding the success or failure of rezon-
ing matters was discernible. At best, one can only conclude that 
the data does not permit stereotyping with respect to public accept-
ance. Although there seemed to be a general trend against the ap-
proval of rezonings from a less intensive to a more intensive land 
use classification, even this generality did not always bear itself out. 
Cuyahoga County's election records did not reveal consistent 
opposition to new commercial or multifamily land uses within the · 
community. Nor did the review indicate that the referendum zon-
ing techniques had been used as exclusionary devices insulating 
localities from unwanted residents or development. It is, however, 
impossible to estimate the number of development proposals requir-
ing zoning changes that never advanced to the rezoning stage simply 
because a referendum requirement existed. Such deterrence is a sub-
tle, yet largely unquantifiable, result of the technique. 
V. CoNCLUSION 
The prior observations concerning referendum zoning are not in-
tended to indicate that the device is a desirable or even innocuous 
local government technique. The Supreme Court's holding in Eastlake 
significantly reinforces the legitimacy of this technique within the 
land use control context. Many states have adopted legislation and 
judicial positions consistent with the Eastlake view. Unfortunately, 
the Supreme Court's support reflects an unrealistic view of local 
government affairs and the value of local democratic expression. 
For example, as practiced in Cuyahoga County, Ohio, referen-
dum zoning subjects both major and minor zoning decisions to voter 
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approval, showering minor rezonings with the same attention war-
ranted by and given to significant questions of community develop-
ment policy. Furthermore, a review of the election records suggests 
that the issues presented to the public are not explained clearly by 
the formal language appearing upon the voter's. ballot. The ballot 
language employed for land use referenda within the study area was 
confusing and occasionally incomprehensible. If zoning referenda 
are to be encouraged as an enlightened form of participatory 
democracy, an interested voter plainly cannot form an educated opin-
ion on the electoral issue based solely upon ballot language. If ballot 
language is t.he primary source of information on a land use issue, 
the voter will have merely the most superficial understanding of the 
question presented. In addition, the Cuyahoga County survey reveals 
that voter participation in land use referenda has been very low. 
Obviously, then, a relatively small percentage of the eligible voters 
within the jurisdiction determine whether a development proposal 
will proceed. In fact, in those jurisdictions having referendum zoning 
systems with the ward veto feature, a mere handful of voters can 
reject a proposal even if the overwhelming majority within the locality 
wishes to approve it. In this instance, the referendum zoning 
mechanism is conspicuously undemocratic. 
What of the quality of the decisions referendum zoning renders? 
Arguably a minor rezoning issue ought not be subjected to referen-
dum approval given its limited impact upon the community. For 
this reason, a number of western states have categorized such rezon-
ings as administrative actions, thereby removing them frorri the 
referendum approval requirement. And, for a different reason, large 
scale rezoning questions may not be well-suited to referendum ap-
proval. These significant developmental changes present complex 
questions of social and economic policy for the local community. 
It seems particularly inappropriate for such a complicated matter 
to be determined on the basis of a "yes" or "no" decision. A 
majority vote does not necessarily reflect a ,rational choice on the 
matter under consideration. Ironically, the referendum requirement 
actually denies meaningful public participation in the selection of 
future community growth policy. By requiring referendum approval 
for these decisions, the ability to establish community goals and to 
implement them through legislative action is withdrawn from the 
popularly elected representatives. The significance of public debate 
before legislative bodies on matters of importance to the community 
is drastically lessened. Mandatory referendum zoning effectively 
devalues the practice of open and full discussion of important com-
munity issues in a public forum. In essence, referendum zoning limits 
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public debate on complex public issues by providing the simple alter-
native of approval or disapproval and decentralizes public respon-
sibility for important decisionmaking. 
A related criticism of the referendum zoning technique is that 
it reflects a basic distrust of local elected officials and the represen-
tative system of government. By installing the plebiscite as a check 
against the malfeasance or nonfeasance of these officials, the com-
munity has established that it does not believe that legislative deci-
sions merit citizen respect. It appears that the referendum zoning 
system relegates the city council to the role of a "super" planning 
commission-one that makes advisory recommendations to the 
public at large for ratification. There should be less drastic ways 
to control the behavior of local legislative officers, with removal at 
the next regularly scheduled election serving as the most direct 
method. 
Beyond the impact of referendum zoning upon the ·integrity of 
the locallegi~lative decisionmaking process is its effect upon the work 
of city planners and planning commissions. Few judicial opinions 
have accorded much attention to this factor, despite the fact that 
referendum zoning seriously interferes with a system that recognizes 
and takes advantage of city planner expertise. The traditional struc-
ture of rezoning practice usually requires that a proposal receive 
approval from the municipality's planning staff, the community's 
planning commission and, finally, the locality's elected officials. 
Regrettably, the referendum technique reduces the incentive for 
thorough project evaluation by planning officials. Further, the long-
term effect of referendum zoning may be to freeze the existing 
municipal zoning map, given that changes must run the gauntlet 
of electoral approval. 
This stultifying effect could have longlasting implications for com-
munity growth and development. The process of community plan-
ning and land use regulation is a dynamic one. Referendum zoning 
seemingly would force a municipality to adhere to conceptions of 
desirable community form and zoning structure not because they 
represent the best plan for local growth, but rather because they 
constitute a known and accepted use of the land within the locality. 
In this sense, the adoption of mandatory referendum zoning 
represents an impressive, conservative force in local affairs. Prior 
to embracing a doctrine encouraging referendum zoning as a means 
of increasing citizen involvement in the affairs of local government, 
states and localities must understand fully the less attractive implica-
tions of the technique. 
